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Abstract
Are country borders still an impediment to trade flows within Europe? Using
a microlevel survey with 3 million annual shipments of goods, we construct a
matrix of bilateral trade for 269 European regions. Take two similar region
pairs, one containing regions in different countries and the other containing
regions in the same country. The market share of the origin region in the
destination region for the international pair is 17.5 percent that of the intra-
national pair. Across industries, this estimate ranges from 12.3 to 38.9 percent.
For post-1910 borders, this estimate is 28.8 percent. The implication is clear:
Europe is far from having a single market.
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Figure 1: Market shares of Catalonia in Europe
Notes: The figure shows the share of spending on Catalan goods in each European region. The shading
represents the value of the market share, with darker shares representing larger market shares. The spending
shares come from our newly built regional trade dataset (see Section 2).
1 Introduction
How do country borders affect trade flows within Europe? Using a newly
constructed data set of regional trade in Europe, Figure 1 shows sales from
Catalonia (shown in grey) to 268 European regions as a share of total spending
in each destination region. A striking aspect of these market shares is their
national bias. Catalonia’s total share of Spanish markets, excluding Catalonia,
is 5.8 percent; while its total share of non-Spanish markets is only 0.26 percent.
Catalonia is not special in this regard, though. A similar national bias emerges
when we examine market shares for other European regions. For the average
region (whose size is about 25 percent that of Catalonia) the intranational and
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international market shares are 2.2 and 0.08 percent respectively.
To what extent is this bias caused by country borders?1 Comparing intra-
national and international trade could be misleading. As Figure 1 shows, Span-
ish regions are on average closer to Catalonia than non-Spanish regions. Since
geographical distance raises transport costs and reduces trade, this creates an
identification problem. A cleaner strategy would be to compare neighbouring
regions. For instance, the market share of Catalonia in Languedoc-Rousillon
(in France just north of Catalonia) is almost three times smaller than the
market share of Catalonia in Valencia (in Spain just south of Catalonia). Is
this difference caused by the French-Spanish border or the Pyrenees mountain
range that coincides with it? We need to make comparisons that control for
factors, such as distance and mountain ranges, that influenced the placement
of borders in the past and may influence trade outcomes today.
To search for these confounding factors, normalize market shares by their




n’s share of market m
n’s share of all markets
)
= ln (n’s sales to m)− ln
(
n’s total sales×m’s spending
spending in all markets
)
where n and m are the origin and destination regions, respectively. The
LHS is the (log) normalized market share, while the RHS is the difference
between the actual (log) sales and the predicted (log) sales using a naïve gravity
model. Naïve gravity applies if (i) regions produce differentiated products;
(ii) regions have common homothetic preferences, and (iii) trade costs are
negligible. Under these assumptions, all regions purchase the same proportions
1We say that there is a border between two regions if they belong to different countries.
Thus, we adopt a purely political view of borders, i.e. having a border means not sharing a
country government.
2To see this relationship, simply note that (i) n’s share of market m equals n’s sales to
m divided by m’s spending; and (ii) n’s share of all markets equals n’s total sales divided
by spending in all markets.
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of all goods and, as a result, these proportions must be the average ones:
n’s sales to m
m’s spending =
n’s total sales
spending in all markets
Since assuming that regions produce differentiated products is uncontroversial,
our search for confounding factors must focus on differences in preferences and
trade costs.
There is a national bias in preferences if, for a common set of prices across
regions, spending falls disproportionally on national goods, i.e. a violation of
assumption (ii). One reason for such a bias is the behavior of governments.
Eager for political support, governments prefer to award procurement con-
tracts to expensive domestic suppliers instead of cheap foreign ones.3 Another
reason for a national bias in preferences is the behavior of individuals, who
often prefer expensive domestic goods than cheap foreign ones. Over the last
couple of centuries, national governments have made massive efforts aimed at
creating a common national identity. Policies such as the adoption of a sin-
gle official language, the advancement of shared interpretations of history and
traditions, the homogenization of educational systems and the promotion of
internal migration, have all contributed to the creation of a national culture
and, together with it, a preference for national goods. We treat this behav-
ior of governments and individuals as endogenous to the border, as channels
through which country borders affect trade.
There is a national cost advantage if trade costs are lower for intranational
than for international trade, i.e. a violation of assumption (iii). Although
tariffs have been eliminated and technical regulations have been de jure har-
monized within Europe, many de facto trade barriers remain. National courts
ruling on contract disputes tend to favor national firms, raising the costs of
foreign firms to operate in the domestic market. National regulators tend to
3Herz and Varela-Irimia (2020) examine 1.8 million European public procurement con-
tracts awarded from 2010 to 2014 and published in the EU’s Tenders Electronic Daily
database. The probability that a firm located in the same region as the contracting author-
ity obtains a contract is 900 times larger than that of a firm located abroad, but only 2
times larger than that of a firm located in another region of the same country.
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impede conformity assessments of foreign products to favor domestic firms.
National agencies create infrastructure systems that favor intranational mo-
bility, often at the expense of international mobility. These factors are endoge-
nous to the border, additional channels through which country borders affect
trade.
There is an important part of the national cost advantage, however, that
is due to geography and cannot be attributed to country borders. The cost
of transporting goods grows with distance and the presence of geographical
obstacles, such as mountain ranges or seas; and it shrinks with the presence of
geographical advantages, such as navigable rivers or plains. Individual spend-
ing falls disproportionally on goods with low transport costs, and these tend
to be lower for intranational trade than for international trade. Interestingly,
geography might also contribute to the national bias in preferences. Even if
technological improvements were to eliminate transport costs, the effects of
geography would still be felt as past transport costs interact with habit forma-
tion to shape present individual preferences. Since geography precedes borders
and causes them (as we shall show formally later), we need an empirical strat-
egy that effectively controls for geographical factors and produces an unbiased
estimator of the causal effect of country borders on trade.
The first step in our empirical strategy is to find the appropriate dataset
to work with. Measuring the border effect essentially amounts to comparing
trade within and across national borders. Although there is plenty of data on
trade across national borders, there is a surprising scarcity of reliable data on
trade within national borders. A first contribution of this paper is to build a
dataset of trade in goods for 269 regions from 24 European countries, using the
European Road Freight Transport survey collected by Eurostat. This survey
annually records around 3 million shipments of goods by road across Europe.
For each shipment, we observe its origin and destination regions, the industry
of the goods shipped, the weight of the shipment and the distance covered.
We aggregate these shipments and impute export prices to build matrices of
bilateral trade flows for 12 industries covering the period 2011 to 2017. This
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dataset provides the first integrated view of regional trade within Europe.
Figure 1, for instance, was simply not known or available before.
The second step in our empirical strategy is to use the causal inference
framework (see Imbens and Rubin (2015)) to design a credible identification
strategy. We first estimate the probability of having a border (or propensity
score) as a function of distance, insularity, remoteness and the presence of
mountain ranges and river basins. These covariates explain almost half of
the border assignment. Figure 2 shows the distribution of propensity scores
for Catalonia (again shown in grey). Interestingly, we find regions in Spain,
Portugal and France that have similar propensity scores, i.e. for which the
border assignment was equally likely ex-ante even though ex-post some have
a border with Catalonia and some do not.
We want an estimator that is not only unbiased, but also has a small
sampling variance. Imbens and Rubin (2015) argue that there are two factors
that reduce the sampling variance: (i) the number of observations (region
pairs); and (ii) the balance or overlap of propensity scores between treated
(region pairs separated by a border) and control (region pairs not separated
by a border) groups. We first examine the entire sample and find that it is
too unbalanced to produce reliable estimates. This should be apparent by
looking at Figure 2. For almost all non-Spanish regions the probability of a
border with Catalonia is higher than 90 per cent. Thus, we trim the sample,
eliminating extreme observations with propensity scores close to zero or one, to
achieve a much better overlap of propensity score distributions between treated
and control pairs. We then use the trimmed sample to construct a blocking
estimator. That is, we build subsamples or blocks of region pairs with similar
propensity scores, we estimate the border effect within these blocks and we
weight the block estimates to produce an average border effect. Since the
probability of having a border is similar between treated and control pairs
within each block, the difference in trade between them can be interpreted as
the causal effect of the border.
Take two similar region pairs, the first one containing regions in different
5
Figure 2: Probability of having a border with Catalonia
Notes: The figure shows the probability of finding a border between Catalonia and each European region
based on a set of geographical covariates (propensity score). The shading represents the value of the market
share, with darker shares representing probabilities closer to one.
countries and the second one containing regions in the same country. The
main result of this paper is that the market share of the origin region in the
destination region for the international pair is only 17.5 percent that of the
intranational pair. We refer to this estimate as the average border effect,
and we say that country borders cause reductions in market shares of 0.175.
This estimate is quite precise and remarkably similar across blocks, i.e. at
different levels of the propensity score. Thus, the specific weighting scheme
chosen for the blocking estimator has little effect on the final estimate. We
do find some variation, though, when we estimate the border effect for each
industry separately. In particular, we find that borders cause reductions in
market shares that range from 0.123 to 0.389.
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How should one interpret and use our estimate of the border effect? Im-
portantly, it should be treated as a “partial-equilibrium” estimate, i.e. as the
effect of changing one border keeping all other borders constant. This partial-
equilibrium clause, which is standard in micro studies that use the causal
inference framework, has an added force in this context. It still contains the
standard requirement that region pairs be small so that “treating” one of them
does not have general equilibrium effects on European trade. But this is not
enough. The units of observation are region pairs, but borders are not bilateral
variables. It is not possible in general to “treat” one region pair only, leaving
all other pairs “untreated”. For instance, consider a counterfactual scenario
in which the French-Spanish border were southwest of Catalonia rather than
north. This produces 37 border changes affecting 22 French regions and 15
Spanish regions. Since these border changes affect only 0.001 percent of all
European region pairs, it seems safe to assume they would have a minor im-
pact on European trade and the partial-equilibrium assumption holds. Thus,
we can use our estimate to say that, if history had been such that Catalonia
were a French region today, its market shares in other French regions would
be 100/17.5 = 5.714 times larger, while its market shares in Spanish regions
would be 17.5/100 = 0.175 times smaller.4
Is our estimate of the border effect large? The answer to this question
naturally depends on one’s own priors. But we can gain some intuition by being
more specific about the counterfactual. After the War of Spanish Succession
(1701-1714), the first Bourbon king of Spain Philip V incorporated Catalonia
as a province of the kingdom of Spain. What would have happened if, instead,
it would have been the French Bourbon king Louis XIV who incorporated
Catalonia as a province of the kingdom of France? It is not too far-fetched to
think that this would have made Catalonia quite different from what it is today.
French would co-exist with Catalan and Spanish would be considered a foreign
language, Catalans would exhibit a taste for French goods and traditions rather
4As we explain in Section 3, our estimate is also conditional on the number of borders
that regions have. In this counterfactual scenario, the number of borders in Catalonia would
drop by 7, and we should adjust our estimate to take this into account. Orders of magnitude
do not change, though.
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than Spanish ones, transport systems would foster mobility north rather than
south, many Catalans would have their origins and family ties in other French
regions rather than in Spanish ones, and so on. Is it surprising to find that, in
this scenario, Catalonia would be trading 5.714 times more with other French
regions and 0.175 times less with Spanish regions today?
An important observation is that our estimate should be treated as an “av-
erage” border effect. One potential source of heterogeneity is the age of the
border. It takes a long time to build a common national identity, or an infras-
tructure system aimed at promoting internal interactions. It takes less time to
implement a procurement system that favors domestic firms or to enact laws
and regulations that protect them from foreign competition. Thus, borders
with different ages might have different effects. Fortunately (at least for our
purposes!), since 1910 Europe has experienced a process of political fragmen-
tation. Indeed, about one third of the region pairs that shared a government in
1910 no longer share a government in 2010. Using the methodology explained
above, we find that post-1910 borders reduce market shares to 28.3 percent of
their potential. This estimate is still large, but substantially smaller than our
estimate of 17.5 percent obtained by pooling pre- and post-1910 borders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how we construct
the dataset. Section 3 explains our identification strategy. Section 4 presents
our results. Section 5 concludes. Before all of this, we review previous efforts
to estimate the border effect.
Literature review: In his pioneering study, McCallum (1995) estimated a
gravity equation (that is, a linear regression of bilateral trade on economic size
and distance) extended to include a border dummy. The estimated coefficient
indicated that, after controlling for economic size and distance, trade between
Canadian provinces was on average 22 times larger than trade between Cana-
dian provinces and US states. Although the notion that borders hinder trade
was not surprising, the magnitude of the effect came as a shock, as model-based
explanations based on conventional trade barriers seemed unable to account
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for the size of the border coefficient.
A first reaction to McCallum’s result was mostly methodological, and it
centered on how to estimate gravity equations that are consistent with the the-
ory. In an influential paper, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) showed that
controlling for differences in price levels, something that McCallum (1995) had
not done, reduced McCallum’s estimate from 22 to 5. The estimation proce-
dure used by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) was somewhat burdensome
and model-dependent. Feenstra (2002) proposed a much simpler fixed-effects
strategy that soon became the standard to estimate gravity equations. This
did not affect, though, the finding that controlling for price levels reduces
McCallum’s estimate from 22 to 5. The methodology to estimate gravity
equations evolved rapidly over the next few years.5 But this has not led to a
revision of the effect of the US-Canadian border.
The first contribution of our paper is to shift the focus away from the
gravity framework, and towards the causal inference framework. The gravity
equation is a relationship between endogenous variables that holds in an inter-
esting class of models that share some assumptions about functional forms. It
is useful and reassuring to know that this relationship holds both in the data
and in the models. But the coefficient of a border dummy in a gravity equa-
tion cannot be interpreted as causal. Borders reduce the spending on goods
produced by a region, lowering its income. And yet gravity equations include
incomes as independent variables alongside the border dummy. This creates
a classic “bad-control” problem when we try to interpret the coefficient of the
border dummy as causal.6 A similar problem applies to bilateral variables
that are typically thrown into gravity equations, such as dummies indicating
5The use of log-linear OLS came under scrutiny due to concerns regarding its perfor-
mance in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and its inability to
incorporate zero trade flows (Helpman et al., 2008). As a consequence, more flexible estima-
tion methods such as Poisson-Pseudo Maximum Likelihood and Gamma-Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood became customary. Head and Mayer (2014) provide a review of these develop-
ments.
6This problem cannot be solved by using origin and destination fixed effects, which are
precisely designed to capture economic size and other factors that are endogenous to the
border.
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a common language or a common currency. The causal inference framework
prescribes specific conditions under which observational data can be used as if
it came from an experimental setting, and it forces us to be explicit about the
assumptions needed to estimate the causal effects of borders on trade. More-
over, by abandoning gravity (only for this purpose!) our estimates do not rely
on specific functional forms or models.
A second reaction to McCallum’s result was to go beyond the US-Canadian
border and look at the effects of other borders. A major obstacle, though, was
the absence of readily available datasets on regional trade for other country
pairs. Wei (1996) and Nitsch (2000) computed intranational trade as national
production minus exports and compared it to international trade for OECD
and European countries, respectively. Later studies measured intranational
trade using data at the region-region level and international trade using data
at the region-country level (See, for instance, Gil-Pareja et al. (2005) and
Coughlin and Novy (2016)). This was indeed an improvement, although com-
parisons between different units are still far from ideal.7
The second contribution of our paper is the construction of a new dataset
of bilateral regional trade for 269 regions in 24 European countries that allows
region-region level comparisons.8 As we show next, this dataset constitutes a
major leap forward in terms of data quality and coverage. We are not aware
of any other dataset with similar characteristics that could be used to reliably
measure the causal effect of country borders on trade.
7The problem is aggravated because working with the wrong units also makes it difficult
to measure distance. Head and Mayer (2009) showed that accurate measurement of distance
is critical to having a precise estimate of the border coefficient. Moreover, Hillberry and
Hummels (2008) and Coughlin and Novy (2016) have shown that using large geographical
units overlooks the non-linear effect of distance on trade, generating an upward bias on the
border coefficient.
8Gallego and Llano (2015) is the only study we have found that uses region-region level
data to measure both types of trade and focuses on a border other than the US-Canadian one.
This study uses a road transport survey to construct a dataset of flows from each Spanish
region to itself, other Spanish regions and to the regions of Spain’s 7 main trade partners
in the EU. The paper however follows the gravity methodology and does not attempt to
estimate the causal effect of the border.
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2 European regional trade: a new dataset
The European Road Freight Transport survey (ERFT) is a micro-level survey
of freight road shipments collected by the statistical office of the European
Union, Eurostat. The ERFT data is collected from a survey of shippers in the
industry, and is therefore similar in nature to the Community Flow Survey data
available for the United States that has been used in a number of empirical
studies. This section describes the main features of the ERFT survey and
shows how we use it to build our dataset.
A natural question is whether freight road shipments are representative of
all trade flows. According to Eurostat’s own statistics, between 2011 and 2017
road freight accounted for about 49 percent of all intra-EU trade in tonne-km
terms, while the share of maritime short-sea shipping and rail transport were
32 percent and 11 percent respectively (the other modes of transportation
reported are inland waterways 4, pipelines 3 and air 0.1). Thus, we think that
our dataset measures a sizeable fraction of intra-European trade.
2.1 From road shipments to regional trade weights
The ERFT survey covers shipments by road aggregated every year from micro-
data collected by a total of 29 European countries, all European Union mem-
bers except for Malta plus Norway and Switzerland.9 Each participating coun-
try chooses a stratified sample of vehicles from the national register of road
freight vehicles, following Eurostat guidelines.10 The operators of the sampled
9The European Union adopted in 1998 regulation to provide a legal base for the collection
of a wide range of data on road freight transport ((EC) 1172/98), laying the emphasis on
quality and comparability of statistical information. This regulation has introduced major
changes in the data collected in order to describe the regional origin and destination of
intra-European Union transport on the same basis as national transportation (Road Freight
Transport methodology, 2016 edition).
10The selection of the sample is made to ensure that the raw survey results are repre-
sentative of the total numbers recorded on the vehicle register. In countries where such a
registry is not available or sufficiently reliable, a register of persons licensed to operate as
road hauliers (company/registered owner for private hauliers) or a business register of com-
panies could be considered. In this case, the sampling unit could be the vehicle operators or
11
vehicle are required to report, for a limited number of days in a month, the
characteristics of all the shipments completed.
The survey requests information at the level of the vehicle, the journey and
the specific goods shipped. At the level of the vehicle, the survey records vehi-
cle characteristics such as age, type of vehicle and ownership. At the journey
level, the questionnaire records whether the journey is loaded or unloaded, the
type of transport (hired or own account) and the type of journey.11 At the
goods level, the record includes the shipment’s weight (kg), the type of goods
carried according to the 2 digit NST 2007 classification, the region of origin
and destination (at NUTS3 level), the actual shipping distance covered and a
sampling weight for each shipment.12 Eurostat aggregates the origin and des-
tination of each shipment into larger regions (at NUTS2 level) for anonymity
reasons. The ERFT survey is available for the period 2011 to 2017. Using this
micro-dataset has several advantages relative to using aggregate trade data.
It also requires us to make some adjustments.
A first advantage of the survey is that it allows us to overcome one of
the main challenges to estimate the border effect: the lack of subnational
trade data. The ERFT survey allows us to distinguish between flows within a
region and flows between regions in the same country for all countries surveyed
except for five one-region countries: Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Luxembourg. For this reason, we drop these countries from the dataset. This
leaves us with 24 countries in our sample: the remaining 22 European Union
countries plus Norway and Switzerland.
A second advantage of the survey is that it is collected from a strati-
fied sample of actual shippers rather than imputed from different aggregated
transport companies. (Road Freight Transport methodology, 2016 edition) Further details
are provided in the ERFT survey documentation.
11The type of journey records whether the journey involved one single transport operation,
several transport operations or a collection/distribution of goods, with many stopping points
for loading and/or unloading in the course of a single journey.
12The weight of shipments is calculated by multiplying reported estimates by the inverse
of the sampling weight. The industry classification followed in the survey is the NST 2007
classification, the “statistical classification of economic activities in the European Commu-
nity”.
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data sources. This means that our data captures, with higher accuracy, the
movement of goods within countries. The survey includes two types of flows:
shipments that move goods between producers and consumers and shipments
that move goods from a producer to an intermediary or from intermediary
to intermediary. What the survey actually captures is the region to region
distribution of goods. In most cases, these shipments will take goods from
the origin to the destination region. Yet, in other cases, these shipments will
be a middle step in a longer distribution chain across European regions, not
coinciding with the observed origin and destination of the trade flow.
To address this limitation, we restrict our sample in three ways. First, we
use the detailed information in the survey to drop journeys that are classified
as distribution journeys. These journeys are characterised by the existence of
several stops between the origin and the destination to load and/or unload
goods. Dropping these journeys seeks to bring our shipment data closer to
trade data.
Second, we restrict the number of industries in the analysis. The shipments
are classified into 20 industries enumerated in Table B.1 in the Appendix. We
adopt two criteria for industry coverage: (i) the industry must be unambigu-
ously associated with trade; and (ii) transport by road must be an important
mode of transport for the industry. The first criterion leads us to discard eight
industries.13 The second criterion leads us to discard one additional industry.14
Thus, we are left with twelve industries.
Finally, we want to make sure that the survey on road shipments is rep-
resentative of aggregate trade. This would not be the case for regions with a
very small share of shipments traveling by road. To ensure this, we restrict
13These industries are: 14 Secondary materials, municipal wastes and other wastes; 15
Mail, parcels; 16 Equipment and materials utilized in the transport of goods; 17 Goods
moved in the course of household and office removals, 18 Grouped goods; 19 Unidentifiable
goods; and 20 Other goods n.e.c. It is unclear to us what fraction of the shipments included
in these categories can be safely classified as trade in goods. For instance, disposing of
waste, distributing mail or moving furniture is clearly not associated with trade.
14This industry is: 2 Coal and lignite, crude petroleum and natural gas. A large fraction
of trade in this industry is transported by railways or through pipelines.
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the number of regions by dropping insular regions very far from continental
Europe. For these small and far away regions, shipments by road are not likely
to be representative.15 Table B.2 in the appendix provides a list of all regions.
After all these adjustments, our dataset contains 269 regions (in 24 coun-







where W itnm is the weight (kg) from industry i shipped from region n to region
m in year t. Since our dataset contains 12 industries and 7 years, we have 84
such matrices.
Figure 3 plots exports (kg) across the countries in our sample in the Y-axis
against bilateral shipments (kg) obtained by aggregating the survey data at
the country level on the X-axis. As we can see, most observations concentrate
along the 45 degree line (Rsq=0.55), showing that our data is very correlated
with aggregate exports data from Eurostat. Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the
appendix plot the same relationship, year-by-year and industry-by-industry.
These figures show that this correlation is also strong when we use data dis-
aggregated by industry and/or year.
2.2 From trade weights to trade values
The survey provides trade weights, and we would like to convert weights into
values. Thus, we look for other data sources. The statistical agencies of
France, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom release data of exports from
individual regions to foreign countries in value and volume. These data allows
us to observe export flows from 66 regions in our sample (belonging to the four
countries mentioned above) to all the remaining countries in our sample. For
these export flows, we observe the value in euros and the quantity in kilograms
15We keep large, close-by islands like Sardinia or Sicily. The survey includes shipments
taken by truck when the truck is loaded on a ship and unloaded after crossing to an island.
Therefore, we can include these larger islands since their trade is well represented in the
survey.
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Figure 3: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figure shows the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in kilograms.
The Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (kg) by country-pair-industry-year using international trade data
from Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (kg) aggregated by country-pair-industry-year
obtained from the ERFT survey.
of export flows, allowing us to compute the price per kilo of exports. Unfortu-
nately, similar data could not be collected for the remaining countries in our
sample. The reason why such regional level data on exports is not available
for other countries is unknown to us and, hopefully, not systematically related
to the price of exports in those regions. Therefore, we think of our data as
incomplete data in which the price of exports is missing for part of the sample.
Imputation methods replace missing values by suitable estimates and then
apply standard methods to the filled-in data. Imputations are means or draws
from a predictive distribution of the missing values, and require a method
for creating a predictive distribution for the imputation that is based on the
observed data. We choose an explicit modelling approach, where the distri-
bution is based on a formal statistical model. In particular, we use regression
imputation, a standard choice of conditional mean imputation. First, the re-
gression of the variable with missing values on other covariates is estimated
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from the complete cases, and then, the resulting prediction equation is used
to impute the conditional mean of the missing values. Regression imputation
is a plausible method, particularly when the chosen covariates explain most of
the variation of the variable with missing values.
Our preferred specification is to pool all time periods and industries to
estimate a linear regression for the (log) of the price of exports, calculated
as the ratio between the value of exports and the weight of exports for each
industry, origin, destination and year. As explanatory variables, we use a
vector of origin and destination characteristics. The only bilateral variable
that we use is distance.16 We also include industry-time dummies to allow for
different time trends in prices across industries. Table C.2 in the appendix
contains the full list of variables included in the price regressions.
Our regression model seems to perform well, as shown in Table B.3 in the
Appendix. The R-squared in the above specifications is higher than 50 percent.
Since the collected variables explain a large share of the variation in export
prices in the subsample with no missing values, we can use the estimated
coefficients from the linear regression to impute the values that are missing.17
With our estimated prices per unit, we can finally construct the trade value
16As shown in Hummels and Skiba (2004), the presence of transport costs leads firms to
ship high-quality goods abroad while keeping low-quality goods for the domestic market.
This is known as the "Alchian and Allen conjecture" (see Alchian and Allen (1964)). An-
other reason why export prices per kilogram could increase with distance is transport costs.
However, our export prices are Free On Board (F.O.B), meaning that they are net from
transport and insurance costs.
17In order to further assess the accuracy of our imputed prices we perform two sets of
checks. First, we perform a series of out-of-sample estimations where we drop one of the four
countries for which we observe regional export prices and we predict export prices for this
dropped country. We then compare our out-of-sample estimates with the actual regional
prices (See Figure A.4 in the Appendix). Second, we collect export value and weights from
Eurostat for all European countries and compute unit export prices for every country-pair
at the industry and year level. We aggregate our region-pair estimated prices to a country-
pair level and compare them to the country-pair price of exports from international trade
data (See Figure A.5 in the Appendix). Both tests suggest that our imputed prices are
reasonable.
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Figure 4: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figure shows the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in euros. The
Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (euros) by country-pair-industry-year using international trade data
from Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (euros) aggregated by country-pair-industry-
year obtained from the ERFT survey after imputing missing prices.






where V itnm = P itnm ·W itnm
where V itnm is the value (euros) from industry i shipped from region n to region
m in year t.
Figure 4 plots exports (euros) across the countries in our sample in the
Y-axis against bilateral shipments (euros) obtained by aggregating the survey
data at the country level on the X-axis. As we can see, most observations
concentrate along the 45 degree line (R-squared = 0.55), showing that our data
is very correlated with aggregate exports data that come from Eurostat when
we use values. Figures A.6, A.7 and A.8 plot the same relationship, industry-
by-industry and year-by-year. These figures show that this correlation is also
strong when we use data disaggregated by industry and/or year.
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2.3 European Regional trade: A first look at the data
Our dataset contains region pairs such that: (i) origin and destination regions
belong to the same country; and (ii) origin and destination regions belong
to different countries. We refer to these two types of trade as intranational
and international, respectively.18 Out of a total of 72,092 region pairs in our
sample, 4,958 are intranational, and 67,134 are international.19
Panel A of Table 1 shows the average values of the two types of trade at
the region-pair and annual level. We see that the average value of trade among
intranational pairs is almost 30 times larger than among international pairs.
This average is unweighted, and one might think that it could be affected
by differences in economic size between groups. We obtain a similar picture,
however, when we look at normalized market shares.
Panel B of Table 1 shows another important feature of our data, the preva-
lence of region pairs that do not trade. Among intranational pairs, 96.8 percent
exhibit positive trade. The picture is quite different when we look at interna-
tional pairs. Among them, only 61.7 percent of pairs trade with each other.
Taking this into account, Panel C of Table 1 shows the same statistics as in
Panel A but now conditional on observing a positive flow of goods. Not sur-
prisingly, this increases the average trade values among international pairs,
without affecting much the average trade values of the other group. The main
takeaway is that the national bias manifests itself both on the intensive and
the extensive margins.
3 Identifying the border effect
The causal relationship of interest is the effect of country borders on trade.
In this section, we describe our empirical strategy to identify this effect which
18We exclude from our sample pairs for which the origin region is the same as the desti-
nation region. Therefore, intranational trade does not include trade within a region.
19These numbers take into account origin and destination. Thus, we count region pair
(n, m) as different than (m, n).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Trade type Intranational trade International trade
Mean Mean
Panel A: Unconditional
Value (Mill. euros) 553.52 18.61
Weight (Mill. Kg) 601.49 9.98
Normalized Market share 10.87 0.27
Panel B: Zero trade observations
Region pairs 4958 67134
Region pairs with no trade 157 25699
Regions pairs with positive trade 4801 41435
Panel C: Conditional on positive trade
Value (Mill. euros) 571.62 30.15
Weight (Mill. Kg) 621.15 16.17
Normalized Market share 11.22 0.44
Notes: This table reports the (unweighted) average bilateral trade flow (euros and kilos) and the (un-
weighted) average normalised market share in our new European regional dataset. Column 1 reports the
average flow between intranational region pairs (origin and destination in regions in the same country) and
column 2 reports the average flow between international region pairs (origin and destination regions in dif-
ferent countries). Panel A reports unconditional statistics. Panel B repors the number of region pairs that
display positive trade and zero trade. Panel C reports statistics conditional on trading.
draws heavily from the causal inference framework (see Imbens and Rubin







m Vnm are the total sales or income of region n; Em =
∑
n Vnm
are the total purchases or spending of region m, and E = ∑mEm is total
spending by all regions. The variable Snm measures region n’s share of re-
gion m’s market normalized by region n’s share of all markets, including its
own. If market m has an average importance to producers of region n, i.e.
Vnm/Em ≈ Yn/E; the market share is one. If instead market m has a larger
(smaller) than average importance, the market share is above (below) one.
Unlike trade values, normalized market shares are not affected mechanically
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by the economic size of origin and destination regions.20 This makes them
more helpful than trade values to infer preference biases and trade costs.
3.1 The border effect
The French-Spanish border runs across Catalonia and Languedoc-Roussillon,
and not across Catalonia and Valencia. Catalonia’s average market share in
all the 269 regions in our sample is 1.5 percent. Given how close Catalonia is
geographically and culturally to Languedoc-Roussillon and Valencia, it is not
surprising that these two markets be specially important for Catalan exporters.
Indeed, the normalized share of Catalonia in the Languedoc-Roussillon market
is well above one, 1.79, implying that 1.79 × 1.5 = 2.7 percent of all the
spending of Languedoc-Roussillon is on products that come from Catalonia.
Yet Catalonia’s normalized share of the Valencia market is almost three times
larger than this, 5.21, implying that 5.21×1.5 = 7.9 percent of all the spending
of Valencia is on products that come from Catalonia. To what extent is this
difference caused by the French-Spanish border? What would have happened
if this border were southwest of Catalonia instead of north? How much would
Catalonia’s share of the Languedoc-Roussillon market grow? How much would
Catalonia’s share of the Valencia market shrink?
Answering these questions involves comparing observed market shares with
the counterfactual market shares that would have occurred if the French-
Spanish border were southwest of Catalonia. More formally, let (n,m) be
a region pair, and let Bnm ∈ {0, 1} be a dummy variable that takes value one
if the regions in the pair belong to different countries, and zero otherwise. Let
Snm be the observed market share for region pair (n,m) in our sample. We
20To see this, assume trade is balanced, i.e. Em = Ym and E = Y. Then, we have that:
lnSnm = lnVnm − lnYn − lnYm + lnY
Since Yn =
∑
m Vnm, one might think that ln Snm is obtained by taking out fixed effects
from ln Vnm. This is close, but not quite right. To construct ln Snm, we subtract and add
the logs of the means to ln Vnm, and not the means of the logs.
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define two potential market shares as follows:
Snm =
 Snm (1) if Bnm = 1Snm (0) if Bnm = 0 (2)
where Snm (1) and Snm (0) are region n’s share of market m with a border
(active treatment) and without a border (control treatment), respectively. For
each region pair, we observe only one potential outcome. For instance, we
observe SCAT,L−R (1) = 1.79 for the pair (Catalonia, Languedoc-Roussillon)
and SCAT,V AL (0) = 5.21 for the pair (Catalonia,Valencia). Unfortunately, we
do not observe SCAT,L−R (0) or SCAT,V AL (1).






Since one potential outcome is unobserved, we cannot observe border effects. It
is tempting however to assume that, if the French-Spanish border were south-
west of Catalonia, the roles of these two markets for Catalan exporters would
reverse, that is, SCAT,L−R (0) = SCAT,V AL (0) and SCAT,V AL (1) = SCAT,L−R (1).
This identification assumption allows us to estimate a common border effect
for the two region pairs as follows:
β = ln SCAT,L−R (1)
SCAT,V AL (0)
= −1.07 (4)
That is, the French-Spanish border reduces Catalonia’s share of the Languedoc-
Roussillon market to a third of its potential: 100 × e−1.07 = 34.3 percent.
Should we take this estimate very seriously? How good is the identification
assumption that underlies it? The main challenge we face in this paper is to
construct samples for which this type of comparisons can be interpreted as
causal.
There are a couple of assumptions embedded in our notation worth men-
tioning explicitly. The first one is that the unobserved potential outcome
21
is unique. As mentioned, moving Catalonia to France would remove the
border between Catalonia and Languedoc-Roussillon. But so would moving
Languedoc-Roussillon to Spain, or creating a new country containing both re-
gions. Our framework implies that SCAT,L−R (0) is the same in all these cases
and, indeed, in any other possible case. This assumption captures the view
that, to a first-order approximation, what matters is whether there is a border
or not. The specific type of border only matters to a second or third-order
approximation. We think this is quite a reasonable view.
Our notation also embeds the notion that the difference in potential out-
comes measures the effect of changing the border for one region pair, keeping
all other borders constant. This partial-equilibrium clause, which is standard
in micro studies that use the causal framework, has an added force in this
context. It still contains the standard requirement that region pairs be small
so that “treating” one of them does not have general equilibrium effects on
European trade. But this is not enough in this context. The units of observa-
tion are region pairs, but borders are not bilateral variables. It is not possible
in general to “treat” one region pair only, leaving all other pairs “untreated”.
Consider again moving the French-Spanish border southwest of Catalonia.
This experiment would remove the border between Catalonia and 22 French
regions and create a border between Catalonia and 15 Spanish regions. Thus,
it would produce 37 border changes. Since these border changes affect only
0.001% of all region pairs, it seems safe to assume they would have a minor
impact on European trade and the partial-equilibrium assumption holds.
Since we cannot experiment with borders, we must rely on observational
data to estimate an average border effect. In particular, we define the average
border effect β as the average log change in market shares caused by the border
as:
β = E ( lnSnm (1)− lnSnm (0)|Snm (1) > 0, Bnm = 1) (5)
The value of β is expected to be negative since the border is expected to reduce
trade. The larger is |β|, the larger is the average reduction in market shares
caused by the border. Throughout, we assume that there are no region pairs
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such that Snm (1) > 0 and Snm (0) = 0. Obviously, this cannot be verified.
The causal inference framework shows that we can use observational data
as if it came from an experiment if the assigment of treatment is (i) probabilis-
tic, (ii) individualistic and (iii) uncounfounded. If the assignment mechanism
satisfies these conditions, the comparison of units with different treatments
but identical pre-treatment covariates can be given a causal interpretation.
We believe that the first two conditions hold in our setting. Probabilis-
tic assignment requires a nonzero probability for each treatment value, for
every unit. The probability that two far-away regions belong to the same
country might be very small, but it is not zero. Individualistic assignment
requires limited dependence of a particular unit’s assignment probability on
the values of covariates and potential outcomes for other units. This is the
partial-equilibrium clause mentioned above, which we argued is a reasonable
one.
The last condition, unconfounded assignment, deserves much more at-
tention. Under unconfoundedness, all the assignment probabilities are free
from dependence on potential outcomes, after conditioning on a vector of
pre-treatment covariates. This assumption is often referred to as the Con-
ditional Independence Assumption (see Dawid (1979)) and written as Bnm⊥
Snm (0) ,Snm(1) Xnm. In our setting, unconfoundedness means that the as-
signment of borders must be independent of potential trade outcomes across
regions, after conditioning on a vector of pre-treatment geographical covari-
ates Xnm. We describe this vector and explain our control strategy in the next
couple of sections.
Let us assume for now that we have a vector of pre-treatement geographical
covariates Xnm such that, after conditioning for them, the border assignment
is unconfounded. This allows us to interpret comparisons between units with
different treatments as causal. Does this mean that we can estimate the bor-
der effect by simply comparing the average market shares of international and
intranational pairs with the same covariate values Xnm = x? The answer,
unfortunately, is negative. The following estimator makes exactly this com-
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parison:
β̂ = E ( lnSnm (1)| Snm (1) > 0, Bnm = 1, Xnm = x) (6)
−E ( lnSnm (0)| Snm (0) > 0, Bnm = 0, Xnm = x)
It is straightforward to see that β̂ suffers from two potential sources of selection
bias:
β̂ − β =
E ( lnSnm (0)| Snm (1) > 0, Bnm = 1, Xnm = x)
−E ( lnSnm (0)| Snm (1) > 0, Bnm = 0, Xnm = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection bias due to the number of borders
(7)
+
E ( lnSnm (0)| Snm (1) > 0, Bnm = 0, Xnm = x)
−E ( lnSnm (0)| Snm (0) > 0, Bnm = 0, Xnm = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection bias due to changes in participation
Consider first the selection bias due to the number of borders, which is
the first term of Equation (7). It might seem surprising that we condition on
the border after assuming that the border assignment is unconfounded. But
there is a subtle source of selection bias that arises from any random border
assignment, including those that are unconfounded. To understand its nature,
consider a world with 6 regions and 2 countries. The six regions are identical in
any possible way, except for the border assignment. The latter is random, with
all regions being equally likely to belong to any country. Let us assume that
the realization of the border assignment is such that regions 1 and 2 belong to
country A, while regions 3, 4, 5 and 6 belong to country B. This introduces
the only source of asymmetry in this world: regions in A have four borders,
while regions in B have only two borders. Assume there are no trade costs
other than those caused by the border, which result in the same percentage
reduction in market shares for all pairs:
β = ln Snm (1)
Snm (0)
for all n,m (8)
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Let SDA and SDB be the market share of any region in A and B in a domestic
market (including itself), respectively. Symmetry and the absence of non-
border related trade costs ensure that, within each country, these shares are
identical for all relevant pairs. Let SFA and SFB to be the market share of any
region in A and B in a foreign market, respectively. Symmetry and the absence
of non-border related trade costs also ensure that, within each country, these
shares are identical for all relevant pairs. By construction, normalized market
shares must add to one. Thus, we have that
2SDA (0) + 4SFA (1) = 4SDB (0) + 2SFB (1) = 1 (9)







= 2 + e
β
2eβ + 1 > 1 (10)
for any value of β < 1. That is, regions with many borders have larger
market shares. The key observation is that region pairs with many borders
tend to be over-represented among international pairs and under-represented
among intranational pairs. This creates a positive selection bias that makes
the observed difference in average market shares smaller (in absolute value)
than the true average border effect.21
Fortunately, there is a simple solution to this problem, namely, to estimate
border effects conditioning on the number of borders. We shall show later
that this type of selection bias is important empirically. But one can already
suspect this by looking at Figure 5, which shows average intranational and
international market shares in panels A and B, respectively. The color of a
region represents the value of the average normalized share, with dark blue
shades representing the smallest values and dark red shades representing the
21The existence of this type of selection bias was noted first by Anderson and VanWincoop
(2003). In their sample, however, the group of intranational pairs contained only Canadian
provinces, i.e. regions with many borders; while the group of international region pairs
contained mostly US states, i.e. regions with few borders. Thus, they found that this type
of selection bias leads to overstating the average border effect. Here, with a balanced sample,
this selection bias leads to understating the border effect.
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Figure 5: Average market share and number of borders
A) Intranational market share B) International market share
Notes: The figure shows the average market share of each region with its intranational partners (panel A)
and with its international partners (panel B). The color shading represents the value of this average, with
cooler colours representing lower market shares and warmer colors representing higher market shares
highest values. In countries with many regions, such as United Kingdom or
Germany, regions have smaller than average intranational and international
market shares (predominantly blue shades). In countries with few regions,
such as Belgium, Slovenia, or Portugal, regions have larger than average in-
tranational and international market shares (predominantly red shades).
Consider next the selection bias due to changes in participation, which is
the second term of Equation (7). This type of selection bias arises because some
region pairs trade without a border, Snm (0) > 0, but would not trade with a
border, Snm (1) = 0. Let us refer to these pairs as switchers. Average market
shares for intranational pairs include switchers, while average market shares
for international pairs do not. If average market shares for switchers and non-
switchers were the same, there would be no selection bias and the second term
in Equation (7) would be zero. But it is reasonable to expect average market
shares for switchers to be lower than those of pairs that always trade. This
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creates a positive selection bias that makes the observed difference in average
market shares smaller (in absolute value) than the true average border effect.
The importance of this bias depends on the fraction of switchers in the
sample. Without this information, we must treat β̂ as a lower bound for the
border effect. We show later, however, that the fraction of switchers must be
quite small in the samples we work with. This means that the bias due to
changes in participation cannot be important quantitatively and, as a result,
β̂ provides a good estimate for the border effect.
To sum up, if the border assignment is probabilistic, individualistic and
unconfounded, we can compare intranational and international pairs and be
confident to obtain a good estimate of the border effect if (i) we condition on
the number of borders; and (ii) we check that the fraction of switchers is small.
3.2 Understanding the border assignment
Geography affects trade costs and market shares. Since geography precedes
borders, this poses an identification problem if the border assignment is also
affected by geography. But it is easy to see that this is indeed the case. Our
comparison of the (Catalonia, Languedoc-Rousillon) and (Catalonia, Valencia)
region pairs shows how difficult it is to escape from this conclusion. Both pairs
are contiguous, continental and located on the Mediterranean coast. Thus,
comparing their market shares already ‘controls’ for some of the most relevant
geographical factors. But even then, we cannot conclude that the location of
the French-Spanish border is unrelated to geographical factors that also affect
trade. On its north, Catalonia is separated from Languedoc-Roussillon by the
Pyrenees mountain range. On its south, Catalonia shares the Ebro river basin
with Valencia. This geographical difference, which affects trade costs, might
have also contributed to the French-Spanish border being north of Catalonia
rather than southwest.
To satisfy the unconfoundedness condition, causal inference must be con-
ditional on those factors that precede and influence both the treatment assign-
27
ment and the outcome variable. In our framework, these are the geographical
covariates that affect the border assignment and trade outcomes simultane-
ously. With this idea in mind, we collect the following set of covariates for
each region pair:
1. Distance. Length of the curve linking the central point of the origin
region (centroid) and the central point of the destination region, in kilo-
meters. We use a curve since we take into account the curvature of
earth’s surface.
2. Insularity. Dummy variable taking value one if there is the need to cross
a sea to reach from one region to the other, and zero otherwise.
3. Mountain ranges. Largest altitude difference between two regions, com-
puted as the difference between the highest altitude point and the lowest
altitude point along the straight line that joins the centre the origin re-
gion (centroid) and the centre of the destination region.
4. River basin. Dummy variable taking value 1 if both regions belong to
the same river basin. We consider the largest rivers in Europe. A map
of the areas covered by each river basin can be found in figure D.1 in the
Appendix.
5. Remoteness. We calculate the remoteness of a region as the sum of the
bilateral distance from that region to every other region in the sample.
Then, we calculate the remoteness of a pair as the average remoteness
of both regions.
All these covariates are known to affect bilateral trade, and they can be
treated as pre-treatment covariates when considering the border assignment.
The next question is whether these covariates also affect the border assignment.
Unlike the theory of bilateral trade, which is quite sophisticated and developed
at this time, the theory of borders is rough and underdeveloped. Thus, we are
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forced to rely on some basic conjectures about how these geographical factors
affect the costs and benefits of sharing a government.22
It seems reasonable to think that distance, insularity and the presence of
mountain ranges all raise the costs and lower the benefits of sharing a gov-
ernment. Thus, we would expect these variables to raise the probability of a
border assignment. It is less clear however to predict the effects of sharing a
river basin. Rivers could be a geographical obstacle such as mountain ranges,
but they could also provide a geographical mobility advantage or create exter-
nalities that raise the benefits of a shared government. Thus, we do not know
a priori whether being in the same river basin raises or lowers the probability
of a border assignment. Unconditionally, we would expect remote region pairs
to have more borders because they are farther away from each other. Con-
ditioning on distance, however, we would expect the probability of a border
assignment for a region pair to increase with their remoteness because they
have fewer alternative partners to share a government.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of these geographical covariates in the
treatment and control groups. Intranational pairs are closer to each other, less
likely to be insular or separated by a mountain range, more likely to share a
river basin, and on average less remote. These differences are significant, and
have the expected sign.23
To obtain a more convincing assessment of the role of geographical co-
variates on the border assignment, we estimate the propensity score.24 In
particular, we estimate a logistic regression model, where the log odds ratio of
receiving the treatment is modeled as linear in a number of the geographical
covariates, with unknown coefficients. We estimate the coefficients by maxi-
22The relevant costs and benefits are those borne by whomever makes the decision. The
decision-maker(s) might be regions in the pair, or other regions elsewhere. Admittedly, the
discussion here is quite superficial.
23The positive sign on the river basin variable is not informative. International pairs are
more distant than intranational ones, making it unlikely that the former be located in the
same river basin. One needs to control for distance to determine how sharing a river basin
affects the border assignment.
24The propensity score at covariate values x is the average probability of border assign-
ment for region pairs (n, m) with covariates Xnm = x.
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Table 2: Covariate distributions across treatment groups
Treatment group Control group Difference
mean mean (t-stat)
Distance 1213.62 315.64 -898.0
(-71.79)
Insularity 0.32 0.06 -0.258
(-27.23)
Mountain Ranges 1473.66 496.08 -977.6
(-37.95)
River Basin 0.04 0.19 0.153
(35.81)
Remoteness 1157.47 1075.85 -81.62
(-17.19)
N 33567 2479 36046
Notes: This table reports the average value of each geographical covariate in the treatment
group (column 1) and in the control group (column 2). The last column reports the difference in
means (defined as control minus treated). The t-statistics in parentheses.Distance is bilateral
distance between origin and destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one of the
regions is an island. Mountain Ranges is the highest difference in elevation between two regions
in metres (difference between highest point and lowest point), River Basin takes value 1 if the
region pair shares a river basin and Remoteness is the average remoteness of the origin and
the destination regions.
mum likelihood. To choose how many of our geographical covariates to include
in the logistic regression, we follow the recursive procedure recommended in
Imbens and Rubin (2015). We find that all the covariates described above
should be included.
Table 3, column (1) presents the estimation results from the logit model.
The coefficients of the covariates are all significative at the 1 percent level and
the model has an R-squared of 0.476. As expected, distance, insularity and
mountain ranges raise the probability of a border assignment, while remoteness
lowers it. Interestingly, we find that being in the same river basin raises the
probability of having a border. It seems thus that rivers promote borders
rather than the opposite.
By its own nature, the unconfoundedness assumption cannot be proved
formally. But economic theory identifies as potential confounding factors a
set of geographical covariates that precede the border assignment and affect
trade costs. We have shown that, indeed, these covariates affect the border
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Table 3: Propensity Models






Mountain Ranges 0.179 0.283
(0.030) (0.031)







Pseudo R2 0.476 0.143
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the logistic regression model, where the log
odds ratio of receiving the treatment (having a border) is modeled as linear in a number
of the geographical covariates. Distance is (log) bilateral distance between origin and
destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one of the regions is an island.
Mountain Ranges is the highest difference in elevation between two regions in metres
(difference between highest point and lowest point, in logs), River Basin takes value 1 if
the region pair shares a river basin and Remoteness is the log of the average remoteness
of the origin and the destination regions.
assignment. Thus, comparisons of units with different treatments can be given
a causal interpretation only if we condition for these pre-treatment covariates.
The next step is to find the right way to do this necessary conditioning.
3.3 Constructing the ‘right’ samples
To measure the border effect we estimate a linear regression model of nor-
malized market shares on the border dummy, controlling for the number of
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borders and the set of geographical covariates:
lnSnm = α + β ·Bnm + γ ·Nnm + λ′ ·Xnm + unm (11)
where Nnm is the log of the number of borders faced by the region pair, and
unm is a zero-mean error term uncorrelated with the regressors.25 Since this
regression controls for both the number of borders and the pre-treatment co-
variates, we can use the estimated value β̂ as a lower bound for the border
effect. If we are also able to show that the fraction of switchers is small, then
β̂ is an unbiased estimate of the border effect.
The question we address now is that of choosing the right sample to esti-
mate the regression model in Equation (11). One might initially think that
we should use the entire sample. After all, using all the information available
is a principled way to proceed. However, Imbens and Rubin (2015) show that
the sampling variance of the estimator β̂ will be large if the population distri-
bution of covariates is unbalanced between treated and control units. Before
using regression methods on the entire sample, one needs to ensure that there
is enough balance or overlap in the two covariate distributions.
To determine whether there is sufficient overlap in our entire dataset, the
left panel in Figure 6 plots the distribution of the estimated propensity score
for control units (empty bars) and for treated units (blue shaded bars). The
overlap of the propensity score distribution for treated and control units is
small. Thus, we trim the data to drop units with extreme values for the es-
timated propensity score, following the procedure recommended by Crump
et al. (2009). This trimming procedure amounts to dropping all observations
for which the propensity score is above or below a threshold determined fol-
lowing a variance criterion.26 We apply this methodology to our sample and
25The number of borders of a given region equals to 268 minus the number of regions
within its country plus 1. The smallest number of borders corresponds to the 38 regions
of Germany, with 231 borders. The largest number of borders corresponds to the 2 regions
of Slovenia and Croatia, with 267 borders. The variable Nnm is the (log) sum of the
borders of the region pair. Thus, the values of Nnm lie between ln (231× 2) = 6.1355 and
ln (267× 2) = 6.2804.
26The idea in Crump et al. (2009) is to choose a subset A of the covariate space X so that
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the estimated propensity score, probability of having a border,
for control units (empty bars) and for treated units (blue shaded bars). Panel A reports the results using the
full sample while panel B reports the results using the trimmed sample (dropping region pairs with extreme
estimated probability of having border).
obtain a value of the threshold equal to 6.5 percent. We trim the sample ac-
cordingly and re-estimate the propensity score. Column (2) in Table 3 presents
the results. The R-squared is now smaller, showing that our covariates explain
now a smaller fraction of the variation in the border assignment, as expected
after dropping observations in the extremes of the propensity score distribu-
tion. The right panel of Figure 6 shows that the distribution of the propensity
score across control and treated pairs has a much higher overlap after trimming
the initial sample.
There are two possible methods to perform inference using the propen-
sity score that are recommended by Imbens and Rubin (2015): matching and
blocking. In our setting, we think a blocking estimator, based on grouping
region pairs with similar propensity score values, is more appropriate. Thus,
there is substantial overlap between the covariate distribution for the treated and control
units. Crump et al. (2009) use the asymptotic efficiency bound for the efficient estimator
for the treatment effect in subset A to choose the trimming threshold. The intuition is that
if there is a value of the covariate space such that there are few treated units relative to the
number of controls, for this value the variance for an estimator for the average treatment
effect will be large. Therefore, excluding units with such covariate values should improve
the asymptotic variance of the efficient estimator.
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Table 4: Summary statistics of covariates by block
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Distance 154.36 186.07 240.35 298.82 349.83 383.02 440.94 480.01 446.70
61.03 74.23 93.43 121.79 143.55 143.03 161.45 136.84 61.64
Insularity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.22
0.08 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.42
Mountain Ranges 208.38 291.05 351.19 466.84 533.75 549.99 596.98 735.32 1244.59
232.38 320.38 376.25 457.99 528.13 545.14 561.71 681.78 888.16
River Basin 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.06
0.45 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.24
Remoteness 1169.05 1097.32 1092.09 1087.40 1081.35 1051.59 1038.82 1002.73 938.72
307.02 268.01 273.50 276.93 275.84 249.16 229.19 187.51 140.79
Propensity score 0.20 0.31 0.44 0.57 0.66 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.89
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
N 323 408 515 698 507 660 1062 1582 354
Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of each geographical covariate and the propensity score in each block. Distance is bilateral distance
between origin and destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one of the regions is an island. Mountain Ranges is the highest difference in elevation
between two regions in metres (difference between highest point and lowest point), River Basin takes value 1 if the region pair shares a river basin and Remoteness
is the average remoteness of the origin and the destination regions.
we build subsamples of pairs such that the border probability is similar. We
call these subsamples blocks. To create them, we follow the procedure rec-
ommended by Imbens and Rubin (2015), using the algorithm in Becker and
Ichino (2002). This algorithm starts by splitting the sample into 5 equally
spaced intervals of the propensity score and then testing whether the aver-
age propensity score of treated and control units does not differ much within
blocks. If it does, the algorithm splits the interval in half and tests again,
until the average propensity score of treated and control units no longer dif-
fers within blocks. Starting from the trimmed sample, this procedure delivers
nine blocks. We have ordered these blocks such that the propensity score is
increasing.
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the covariates and the propen-
sity score by block. Recall that there are two factors that reduce the sampling
variance of the estimates: (i) the number of observations; and (ii) the bal-
ance between treated and control groups. The number of observations varies
substantially across blocks, ranging from 323 in Block 1 to 1582 in Block 8.
Blocks also vary substantially in terms of their propensity score, ranging from
20 percent in the first block to 89 percent in the ninth one. Blocks 3, 4 and 5
are the most balanced ones with a propensity score of 44, 57 percent and 66
percent, respectively.
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Table 5: Balancing test of covariates by block
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Distance -22.24 8.207 5.049 4.693 17.13 -11.79 -24.16 -33.09 28.87
(8.077) (8.126) (8.290) (9.269) (13.42) (12.40) (12.07) (9.763) (9.636)
Insularity -0.00990 0.0206 0.0166 0.0187 0.0302 0.0125 -0.00573 -0.0613 -0.00663
(0.0105) (0.0132) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0190) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0234) (0.0660)
Mountain Ranges -31.46 25.23 -16.62 -120.6 -148.1 -114.3 -96.62 -139.1 45.43
(31.06) (35.09) (33.39) (34.56) (49.01) (47.07) (41.96) (48.70) (140.6)
River Basin 0.0528 -0.0328 -0.00768 0.0366 0.0247 -0.0101 -0.00522 -0.0304 0.0285
(0.0608) (0.0495) (0.0362) (0.0296) (0.0350) (0.0303) (0.0242) (0.0219) (0.0382)
Remoteness -109.7 51.41 30.83 20.83 44.75 -5.539 -21.53 -54.87 59.66
(40.65) (29.26) (24.24) (21.06) (25.75) (21.61) (17.15) (13.36) (22.06)
N 323 408 515 698 507 660 1062 1582 354
Notes: This table reports the difference in means between treated and control region pairs for each geographical covariate by block (defined as control minus
treated). Standard errors in parenthesis. Distance is bilateral distance between origin and destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one of the
regions is an island. Mountain Ranges is the highest difference in elevation between two regions in metres (difference between highest point and lowest point),
River Basin takes value 1 if the region pair shares a river basin and Remoteness is the average remoteness of the origin and the destination regions.
Table 5 reports the t-statistic from a difference in means test between
treated and controls (test is defined as control mean minus treatment mean).
Covariates are well balanced within blocks, with only small differences in means
that do not seem to follow a systematic pattern. If the covariates were per-
fectly balanced within blocks, we could estimate causal effects as if assignment
was random within each block. That is, we could compare the means of the in-
ternational and intranational pairs controlling only for the number of borders.
Since three out of five covariates are continuous, however, it is unavoidable to
have some small variation in covariates within blocks. In this case, Imbens and
Rubin (2015) recommend that these comparisons also control for covariates.
Thus, we shall estimate the regression model in Equation (11) for each of the
blocks.
To give a sense of the composition of the blocks in terms of regions, Figure
7 shows the frequency with which each region appears (as a part of a pair)
within the control and treated groups in block 4. This block has an average
propensity score of 57 percent. That is, region pairs within this block had
roughly an equal chance of having a border than not having one. In this block
we find regions from all around Europe both in the treated and in the control
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Figure 7: Composition of regions in block 4
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with
which each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second
panel) in the block.
units. The composition of regions changes across blocks. As we would expect,
blocks 1 and 2 source mostly from region-pairs that are at short distances
while blocks 7, 8 and 9 contain regions located in the largest countries, since
region-pairs are, on average, further away. The figures for all the blocks can
be found in the Appendix.
Let us go back to our example of Catalonia, Languedoc-Roussillon and
Valencia. Figure 8 shows all the pairs that contain Catalonia (shown in grey)
in our sample. The color of each region represents the block in which the
corresponding pair is located. White-colored regions are pairs that have been
dropped after trimming, for which the probability of a border was close to
1. There is no pair that includes Catalonia in block 1, indicating that the
probability of Catalonia having a border with any of its neighbours was always
20 percent or larger. Languedoc-Roussillon is in block 5, where the average
probability of a border is about 66 percent; and Valencia is in block 3, where
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Figure 8: Distribution of Blocks for region-pairs with Catalonia
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of a pair that includes Catalonia in the trimmed sample.
The colors represent the block in which each region pair is included. The blocks are ordered as increasing
in the propensity score. Darker shading represents higher probability of having a border.
the average probability of a border is about 44 percent.
Figure 8 allows us to illustrate our identification strategy, and the motiva-
tion behind our approach. Notice that block 7 contains intranational pairs, in
Spain, as well as international pairs, in France and Portugal. The former will
be used as control units, while the latter will be used as treated units. Region
pairs in block 7 have a probability close to 78 percent of being separated by a
border. Given that this probability is very similar across treated and control
units, the difference in trade between them can be interpreted as the causal
effect of the border.
We have now constructed the samples we needed to estimate the border
effect. Before using them, though, we need to assess how important is the
participation bias in these samples (recall Equation (7) and the discussion
after it). Table 6 shows how participation rates differ between treated and
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Table 6: Participation rate: Control vs. Treated
All Trimmed Blocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Part. rate control 0.968 0.976 1 .997 .993 .987 .968 .968 .936 .952 .915
Part. rate treated 0.617 0.946 .993 .996 .996 .969 .947 .957 .95 .928 .894
N 72092 12220 646 816 1030 1396 1014 1320 2124 3164 710
Notes: This table reports the share of region pairs that engage in positive trade in our regional trade dataset (participation rate) for the
region pairs in the treated and control groups.
control groups in the entire sample, the trimmed sample and in each of the
blocks. Participation rates among control units are high in all the samples.
In the entire sample, however, the participation rate among treated units is
only 61.7 percent. This must be due to the fact that many international
pairs are far away and likely to have a border. Indeed, participation rates in
the trimmed sample increase dramatically among the treated, becoming quite
close to those in the control group. The participation rates within blocks are
even more balanced. Thus, we conclude that the participation bias cannot be
large within these blocks. Remarkably, our construction of blocks has achieved
an almost perfect balance in participation rates without using any outcome
variables in the procedure. This provides additional support for our chosen
empirical strategy.
4 Causal effect of borders on trade
Finally we are ready to present our results. We show first our estimation of
the average border effect and we continue with the estimation of the border
effect across industries. Finally, we present our estimation of the effect recent
borders.
4.1 Average Border effect
Table 7 shows the results of estimating Equation (11) for each of the blocks.
Recall that the estimated coefficient on the border dummy is the log reduc-
tion in the normalized market share caused by the border, that is, the average
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Table 7: Average border effect
Dep. Var: ln(Sn,m) Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 Block 8 Block 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Border -1.786 -1.721 -1.699 -1.768 -1.686 -1.796 -1.687 -1.754 -1.858
(0.182) (0.178) (0.175) (0.175) (0.238) (0.289) (0.268) (0.290) (0.201)
Number of Borders 7.058 6.695 7.041 10.779 11.294 11.833 9.234 8.091 0.420
(1.756) (1.970) (2.034) (1.730) (2.064) (2.783) (2.792) (3.063) (2.944)
Geographic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 645 813 1024 1364 968 1267 2011 2948 637
R2 .572 .533 .501 .47 .375 .388 .31 .285 .299
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the (log) normalized market share of n in m. Border
is a dummy for international border. Number of borders is the (log) sum of the number of borders that are faced by n and m.
border effect within the block. This effect is large, statistically significant
at the one percent level, and it varies little across blocks. The border ef-
fect ranges from a minimum of −1.686 in block 5 to a maximum of −1.858
in block 9, which indicate that borders reduce trade to somewhere between
18.5 (= exp {−1.686}) and 15.6 (= exp {−1.858}) of their potential.
Table 7 also shows the effect on normalized market shares caused by the
number of borders. Recall that the coefficient on this variable measures the
elasticity of the normalized market share with respect to the number of borders.
This elasticity varies across blocks, ranging from 6.695 in block 2 to 11.833
in block 6. Since Nnm ∈ [6.1355, 6.2804] in our sample, we have that the
difference in market shares caused by differences in the number of borders
might be substantial. To put an upper bound to this difference, compare the
region pair containing the two Slovenian regions, which is in block 1, with a
region pair containing two German regions in the same block. According to
our estimates, the normalized market share for the Slovenian pair is about
2.78 (= exp {7.058× 0.1449}) larger than that of the German pair. Thus, our
estimates reveal an additional important channel through which the border
assignment affects trade. It is not only whether a border is assigned to a
specific region pair that matters, but also how many borders are assigned to
each region in the pair.
Let us now use these results to be a bit more precise about the coun-
terfactual scenario discussed in the introduction, in which the French-Spanish
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border is southwest rather than north of Catalonia. Recall that the region pair
(Catalonia, Languedoc-Roussillon) is in block 5, and that the change in the
French-Spanish border reduces the number of borders of Catalonia by 7 and
for Languedoc-Roussillon by 1. Then, we can compute the effect of this change
in the border as the product of two separate effects: (i) the average border
effect which increases the market share by a factor 5.398 (= exp {1.686}); and
(ii) the number-of-borders effect which lowers the market share by a factor
0.839 (= exp {11.294(−0.0155)}). Thus, our estimates indicate that Catalo-
nia’s market share of the Languedoc-Roussillon market would be 4.530(= 5.398×
0.838) larger than it is today. Since the region pair (Catalonia, Valencia) is
in block 3 and the change in the French-Spanish border increases the number
of borders of Valencia by 1, Catalonia’s share of the Valencia market would
be 0.165 (= exp {−1.699 + 7.041(−0.0119)}) smaller than it is today. These
numbers are a bit different from those we showed in the introduction because
the latter did not take into account the number-of-borders effect.
Table 8 reports the average border effect, after aggregating our regression
results by block. We present two possible average treatment effects, weighting
the coefficients by the size of the block (row 1) and weighting by the number of
treated units in each block (row 2) (see Imbens and Rubin (2015)). The average
effect of the border is negative and large in magnitude, and the weighting
method does not make much of a difference. Our findings suggest that the
border reduces trade between two regions to 17.5 percent of what they would
Table 8: Average Border Effect (Average treatment effect)
Estimated βATE
All controls Without number of borders
Weights: Size of blocks -1.744 -1.299
Weights: Treated pairs -1.747 -1.303
Notes: Average treatment effect calculated by computing the weighted average
of the estimated coefficient of the Border dummy. The first row uses the number
of observations in each blocks as weights, while the second row uses the number
of treated units in each block.
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Table 9: Average Border effect using the full and trimmed samples




Number of Borders 7.944 8.346
(1.807) (1.647)
Geographic Covariates Yes Yes
N 46236 11677
R2 .482 .642
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses. Dependent
variable is the (log) normalized market share of n in m. Border is a dummy for international
border. Number of borders is the log of the total number of borders that are faced by n
and m.
trade without the border (exp{−1.744} = 0.175).
A key step in our identification strategy is to control for the number of
borders. This matters not only in itself as argued already, but also to avoid
a selection bias problem when estimating the average border effect. As dis-
cussed in section 3.1, region pairs with many borders tend to have larger
market shares and tend to be over-represented among international pairs and
under-represented among intranational pairs. This creates a positive selection
bias that makes the observed difference in average market shares smaller (in
absolute value) than the true average border effect. To show that this source
of selection bias is relevant, the second column of Table 8 reports the estimated
average border effect that we would obtain if we failed to control for the num-
ber of borders. This biased estimate of −1.299, would lead us to believe that
the border reduces normalized market shares to 27.3 percent of its potential
instead of the true estimate of 17.5 percent.
Another key step in our identification strategy is trimming the data set.
Table 9 shows the results of running Equation (11) with the entire sample and
the trimmed sample. For the full sample we obtain an estimate of −1.968,
which would lead us to believe that the border reduces normalized market
shares to 14 percent of its potential. For the trimmed sample we obtain an
estimate of −1.716 which is essentially the same as the one provided by the
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Table 10: Border effect across industries and blocks
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 Block 8 Block 9 ATE: W ATE: T
INDUSTRY
1. AGRI -1.851∗∗∗ -1.813∗∗∗ -1.659∗∗∗ -1.384∗∗∗ -1.241∗∗∗ -1.611∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗ -1.620∗∗∗ -1.995∗∗∗ -1.578 -1.559
2. MINE -1.714∗∗∗ -2.017∗∗∗ -1.607∗∗∗ -1.592∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗ -1.374∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗∗ -1.019∗∗∗ -2.054∗∗∗ -1.471 -1.395
3. FBT -2.488∗∗∗ -2.464∗∗∗ -2.163∗∗∗ -2.084∗∗∗ -2.034∗∗∗ -2.024∗∗∗ -1.977∗∗∗ -1.954∗∗∗ -2.196∗∗∗ -2.095 -2.047
4. TEX -1.333∗∗∗ -1.195∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ -1.053∗∗∗ -0.830∗∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗∗ -1.307∗∗∗ -0.945 -0.904
5. WOOD -1.532∗∗∗ -1.641∗∗∗ -1.366∗∗∗ -1.429∗∗∗ -1.369∗∗∗ -1.360∗∗∗ -1.488∗∗∗ -1.588∗∗∗ -1.828∗∗∗ -1.499 -1.505
6. COKE/PET -2.025∗∗∗ -1.314∗∗∗ -1.221∗∗∗ -0.787∗∗∗ -0.702∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -1.592∗∗∗ -0.995 -0.866
7. CHEM -1.373∗∗∗ -1.278∗∗∗ -1.206∗∗∗ -1.388∗∗∗ -1.080∗∗∗ -1.267∗∗∗ -1.298∗∗∗ -1.308∗∗∗ -1.249∗∗∗ -1.282 -1.280
8. NON-MET -1.936∗∗∗ -1.975∗∗∗ -1.850∗∗∗ -2.030∗∗∗ -1.767∗∗∗ -1.951∗∗∗ -1.739∗∗∗ -1.834∗∗∗ -2.122∗∗∗ -1.886 -1.874
9. MET -1.239∗∗∗ -1.254∗∗∗ -1.372∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗∗ -1.400∗∗∗ -1.363∗∗∗ -1.218∗∗∗ -1.459∗∗∗ -1.719∗∗∗ -1.384 -1.400
10. MACH -2.260∗∗∗ -1.841∗∗∗ -1.834∗∗∗ -1.698∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -1.511∗∗∗ -1.364∗∗∗ -1.619∗∗∗ -1.430∗∗∗ -1.627 -1.565
11. VEH -1.545∗∗∗ -1.303∗∗∗ -1.366∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗∗ -1.091∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗ -1.233∗∗∗ -1.338∗∗∗ -1.762∗∗∗ -1.330 -1.321
12. OTHER -2.029∗∗∗ -1.589∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ -1.494∗∗∗ -1.372∗∗∗ -1.283∗∗∗ -1.272∗∗∗ -1.165∗∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ -1.406 -1.348
Aggregate BE -1.786 -1.721 -1.699 -1.768 -1.686 -1.796 -1.687 -1.754 -1.858 -1.744 -1.747
Notes: This table reports the estimated border effect (coefficient on dummy Border, in regression equation (11)) by industry (rows) and block (column).The
last two columns report the average border effect computed using as weights the size of the block (ATE: W) and the number of treated region pairs (ATE:
T). The last row (Average BE) reports the average border effect across industries, as reported in table 7.
blocking estimator. This is consistent with our finding that the average border
effect varies very little across region pairs with different propensity scores.
4.2 Border effect across industries
The average border effect may hide some cross-industry heterogeneity.27 We
report now the results of estimating Equation (11) industry by industry. Im-
portantly, we can use the estimated propensity score and the same blocks,
since both are constructed from region-pair covariates that are constant across
industries.
Table 10 presents the results for all industries. The border effect is neg-
ative and statistically significant in all blocks in all industries (coefficients
represented with confidence intervals in figure A.17 in the Appendix). As we
could anticipate, the average border effect masks some heterogeneity. The
industry “Food, Beverage and Tobacco”, in column (10) of row (3), has a
weighted coefficient of -2.095, meaning that the border effect is 0.123. The
industry “Textiles”, in column (10) of row (4), has a weighted coefficient of
-.945, implying that the border effect is 0.389.
Our industries are very aggregated and it is difficult to say much about
27Using total trade flows misses the fact that industries have varying trade cost elasticities
(Chen and Novy, 2012) and select into geographies taking into account border related costs.
Therefore estimates that employ aggregated data at the industry level risk suffering from
compositional bias (Hillberry, 1999).
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these differences in the border effect. But we do notice that lower border
effects, of around -1.4 are estimated in Chemicals, Metals and Vehicles. While
higher border effects, of around -1.6, are found in Wood and Cork Products
and Paper, Non Metals, Machinery and Agriculture. This is suggestive of an
increasing border effect for more differentiated or more transformed goods.
The last row of Table 10 reports the average border effect estimated in the
previous subsection. In all industries but two this average effect is larger than
the industry border effect. In the first blocks, columns 1 to 4, the estimates of
the border effect for some industries are below the average and some are above.
However, in blocks 5 to 8 we see that the estimates of the border effect for
almost all industries are below the average. At first sight, this seems puzzling,
since the average border effect is estimated by aggregating the industry-level
data. The explanation for this observation is the imbalance in participation
rates between treated and controls in this second set of blocks. As explained
in the previous section, this generates a participation bias that leads to an
underestimation of the border effect.28
4.3 Effects of post-1910 borders
We next examine whether the border effect varies with the age of the border.
Our sample contains borders that were created several centuries ago, such as
the French-Spanish border, together with borders that were put in place only
some decades ago, like the border between the Czech Republic and Slovakia
that was established in 1993. It is plausible to think that effects of these
borders might be quite different.
Figure 9 shows borders in Europe in 1910 and 2010. The 1910 set of
borders is the culmination of a process of political integration that included, for
instance, the unification of Italy and Germany. After 1910, this trend reversed.
28Figure A.18 in the Appendix plots the differences in participation (share of trading pairs)
between treated and control units in each industry and block. As expected, participation
rates are very similar in all industries in blocks 1 to 3, but much larger for control pairs in
other blocks.
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Figure 9: Recent and old borders
A) Borders in 1910 B) Borders in 2010
Notes: This figure shows European borders in 1910 (panel A) and in 2010 (panel B).
The 2010 set of borders shows the effects of a process of political disintegration
which included, for instance, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire and
the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, about one third of the
region pairs that shared a government in 1910 no longer share a government
in 2010.
We take 1910 as our reference year and split our sample of region pairs into
four groups, according to their border history. The largest group consists of
regions that are in different countries both in 1910 and in 2010, and contains
90 percent of our observations. The second largest group consists of regions
that have always been in the same country, and contains 6.3 percent of our
observations. The third largest group consists of regions that were in the same
country in 1910, but are no longer in the same country in 2010. This group
contains about 3.1 percent of our observations. The final and smallest group
consists of regions that were in different countries in 1910 and now are in the
same country. This group contains only 0.5 percent of our observations.
To measure the effects of adding a new border, we compare outcomes be-
tween the groups that were in the same country in 1910. As mentioned, about
a third of the regions who shared a country in 1910, no longer do so in 2010.
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Table 11: Propensity Models for region pair with border 1910=0






Mountain Ranges 0.071 -0.007
(0.052) (0.055)







Pseudo R2 0.222 0.139
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the logistic regression model, where the
log odds ratio of receiving the treatment (having a border) is linear in the geographical
covariates. Distance is (log) bilateral distance between origin and destination in km,
Insularity takes value 1 if one of the regions is an island. Mountain Ranges is the
highest difference in elevation between two regions in metres (difference between highest
point and lowest point, in logs), River Basin takes value 1 if the region pair shares a
river basin and Remoteness is the log of the average remoteness of the origin and the
destination regions.
Thus, we have a good balance between treated and controls to perform in-
ference. It would be interesting also to measure the effects of removing an
old border by comparing outcomes between the groups that were in a different
country in 1910. Unfortunately for our purposes, almost none of the regions in
these two groups share a country today. There is simply too much imbalance
between treated and controls to perform inference.29
We start with a sample containing the two groups that were in the same
country in 1910. Starting from this sample, we repeat the steps explained
in section 3. We re-estimate the propensity score and we trim the sample
to achieve a good overlap between treated and control units. Table 11 re-
ports the estimation of the propensity score model for the full sample and the
29Previous studies in the literature have found persistent effects of bygone borders on
trade. Nitsch and Wolf (2013) find persistence of the former inner German border on current
intra-German trade by road, although the estimated border effect has been declining over
time. Beestermöller and Rauch (2018) explore how the trading capital accumulated between
members of the Astro-Hungarian empire still drives preferential trade between European
countries even after the Fall of the Iron Curtain.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the estimated propensity score, probability of having a border,
for control units (empty bars) and for treated units (blue shaded bars). Panel A reports the results using the
full sample while panel B reports the results using the trimmed sample (dropping region pairs with extreme
estimated probability of having border).
trimmed sample, whereas Figure 10 shows the distribution of the propensity
score among treated and control units. We then create blocks and report the
summary statistics of the covariates and the balancing test in Tables B.6 and
B.7 in the Appendix. This procedure now generates 6 blocks.
Table 12 reports the results of estimating Equation (11) with this subsam-
ple. We find a negative and significant border effect for post-1910 borders,
albeit smaller than the average border effect without conditioning on histori-
cal borders. The average border effect is -1.261 (-1.221) weighting by size of
block (treated). This means that the border reduces the market share to 28.3
percent (29.5 percent) of its potential. These findings show that borders that
have been in place for less than a century have large trade reducing effects,
although smaller than those of older borders.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have built a European regional trade dataset and we have
estimated the average border effect on trade flows using a new identification
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Table 12: Average border effect when Border in 1910=1
Dep. Var: ln(Sn,m) Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border -1.439 -1.165 -1.129 -1.290 -1.169 -1.189
(0.259) (0.305) (0.301) (0.415) (0.322) (0.405)
Number of borders 7.503 7.325 7.714 7.239 8.364 14.124
(2.120) (2.765) (3.502) (4.762) (4.696) (4.240)
Geographical covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1530 1082 894 703 554 298
R2 .612 .505 .432 .443 .353 .418
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the (log)
normalized market share of n in m. Border is a dummy for international border. Number of borders is the (log) sum
of the number of borders that are faced by n and m.
framework. Our results show that the effects of country borders on trade flows
within Europe are large. Take two similar region pairs, the first one containing
regions in different countries and the second one containing regions in the same
country. The market share of the origin region in the destination region for
the international pair is only 17.5 percent that of the intranational pair. We
refer to this estimate as the average border effect. It seems, then, that we are
still far from having a single market in Europe. Country borders have created
a national bias in preferences and a national cost advantage that penalize
international trade and foster intranational trade. How do country borders
affect trade flows? What are the welfare implications? Providing satisfactory
answers to these questions is a major research goal on its own, one which is
likely to deliver important policy implications for Europe.
We view our contribution as part of a broader research program on the
effects of country borders within Europe. To start with, we are currently using
our new dataset and the empirical framework developed here to measure the
effect of regional governments. In this paper we have focused on the effects
of country governments. Yet, regional governments also make decisions about
procurement, infrastructure, laws and regulations and so on. What is the
effect of regional borders on trade? This project will allow us to obtain a
more detailed and precise picture of the effects of different types of political
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borders.30
The broader research program we envision should go beyond estimating the
size of border effects, and also try to disentangle the relative importance of the
different channels through which country borders affect trade.31 Some insight
can be obtained by looking at differences in the estimates across industries
and between new and old borders provided here. But this only scratches the
surface. One would like to have precise answers to questions such as: How
much would the border effect be reduced if the European Union were able to
eliminate the large observed national bias in government procurement? How
much would the border effect be reduced if the European Union were able to
build a truly European transportation network? Answering these and related
questions is only possible with a reliable empirical strategy that addresses the
endogenous assignment of borders such as the one developed in this paper.
The research program we have in mind should also go beyond trade flows
and examine the effects of country borders on other economic and social in-
teractions. Country borders have implications that go far beyond trade flows.
The approach developed here could also be used to measure the effect of bor-
ders on migration and investment flows, cultural values, travel and tourism,
cooperation in research projects, joint sports activities, and so on. It would be
useful to have a broader picture of how country borders within Europe affect
economic and social interactions among its regions.
Carrying out this project also made it clear to us that we need a richer
theory. Our results suggest that modeling borders is crucial to understand the
patterns of intranational and international trade. We have wonderful quanti-
tative theories of trade that realistically model the incentives and constraints
30There are a few papers that have looked at the effects of regional borders using the
gravity framework. For instance Wolf (2000), Coughlin and Novy (2012) and Garmendia
et al. (2012).
31There are some papers that have explored a few these channels: Turrini and van Ypersele
(2010) explore the effects of judicial systems, Bailey et al. (2020), Combes et al. (2005) and
Fukao and Okubo (2004) explore the role of social and business networks, Schulze and Wolf
(2009) focus on ethno-linguistic factors, and Chen (2004) analyzes technical barriers to trade
and product-specific information costs increase the effect of borders on trade.
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faced by consumers and firms. But these quantitative theories rarely include
a realistic description of the incentives and constraints faced by governments.
If modeled at all, governments either act mechanically or solve some unreal-
istic social planner problem. How are procurement decisions made? How are
infrastructures chosen? How are laws and regulations decided and enforced?
Only a realistic and detailed modeling of the behavior of governments can
shed light on the channels through which political borders affect trade and
welfare. Fortunately, there is a lot of excellent work on the political economy
of trade policy to draw upon for this purpose (See, for instance, Grossman and
Helpman (2001)).
Much less developed is the theory of country borders. It is here where
we have felt more at sea when working on this project. Understanding the
border assignment is key to develop a sound identification strategy. And yet
there does not exists a theory of borders that is developed at the same level
of sophistication, say, than the theory of international trade. There exist
some classic approaches to modeling and understanding country formation
(see Spolaore and Alesina (2003)); and some recent ones too (see Cervellati
et al. (2019) and Gancia et al. (2020)). But these theoretical frameworks
can only be seen as promising prototypes, much work is needed to develop
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A Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figures show the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in kilograms in
each year. The Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (kg) by country-pair-industry-year using international trade
data from Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (kg) aggregated by country-pair-industry-year
obtained from the ERFT survey.
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Figure A.2: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figures show the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in kilograms in each
industry. The Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (kg) by country-pair-industry-year using international trade
data from Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (kg) aggregated by country-pair-industry-year
obtained from the ERFT survey.
54
Figure A.3: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figures show the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in kilograms in each
industry. The Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (kg) by country-pair-industry-year using international trade
data from Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (kg) aggregated by country-pair-industry-year
obtained from the ERFT survey.
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Figure A.4: Out-of-sample Estimates
Notes: These figures show the out-of sample check to confirm the performance of the price imputation
methodology. Each figure reports the (log) price per kg of exports of France, Germany, Spain and UK to
all the countries in our sample by industry and year. The X-axis reports the estimated (log) price per kg of
shipment in our regional trade dataset aggregated at the country-pair-industry-year level, predicted when
we drop France, Germany, Spain and UK respectively.
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Figure A.5: Country-to-Country Estimates
Notes: This figure shows the correlation between the price per kg of exports in international trade data
and the imputed prices in our sample. The Y-axis reports the (log) price per kg of exports by country-pair,
industry and year. The X-axis reports the estimated (log) price per kg of shipment in our regional trade
dataset aggregated at the country-pair-industry-year level. In this figure we use all countries except France,
Germany, Spain and United Kingdom.
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Figure A.6: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figures show the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in euros in each year.
The Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (euros) by country-pair-industry-year using international trade data from
Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (euros) aggregated by country-pair-industry-year obtained
from the ERFT survey.
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Figure A.7: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figures show the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in euros
in each industry. The Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (euros) by country-pair-industry-year using
international trade data from Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (euros) aggregated
by country-pair-industry-year obtained from the ERFT survey.
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Figure A.8: Correlation with aggregate international trade data
Notes: The figures show the correlation between exports and shipments in the ERFT survey in euros
in each industry. The Y-axis represents (log) bilateral trade (euros) by country-pair-industry-year using
international trade data from Eurostat. The X-axis shows bilateral shipments by road (euros) aggregated
by country-pair-industry-year obtained from the ERFT survey.
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Figure A.9: Composition of regions in block 1
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
Figure A.10: Composition of regions in block 2
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
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Figure A.11: Composition of regions in block 3
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
Figure A.12: Composition of regions in block 5
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
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Figure A.13: Composition of regions in block 6
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
Figure A.14: Composition of regions in block 7
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
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Figure A.15: Composition of regions in block 8
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
Figure A.16: Composition of regions in block 9
A) Control group B) Treated group
Notes: This figure shows the regions that are part of the block. The shading represents the frequency with which
each region appears (as a part of a pair) in the control group (first panel) and treated group (second panel) in the
block.
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Block
Machin. Vehicles Others
Notes: These figures show the coefficient of the dummy Border estimated with specification (11) in each block and
industry (dot). The confidence interval for the coefficient is represented by the vertical lines.
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Notes: These figures show the participation rate (share of region pairs that display positive trade) in the control














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.2: Sample of Regions
Country Region Label









BE BE10 Bruxelles-Capitale/Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest
BE BE21 Prov. Antwerpen
BE BE22 Prov. Limburg (BE)
BE BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen
BE BE24 Prov. Vlaams-Brabant
BE BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen
BE BE31 Prov. Brabant Wallon
BE BE32 Prov. Hainaut
BE BE33 Prov. Liège
BE BE34 Prov. Luxembourg (BE)
BE BE35 Prov. Namur
BG BG31 Severozapaden




BG BG42 Yuzhen tsentralen
CZ CZ01 Praha
CZ CZ02 Střední Čechy
Continued on next page
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EL EL41 Voreio Aigaio
EL EL42 Notio Aigaio
EL EL43 Kriti
EL EL51 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
EL EL52 Kentriki Makedonia
EL EL53 Dytiki Makedonia
EL EL54 Thessalia
EL EL61 Ipeiros
Continued on next page
70
Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Region Label
EL EL62 Ionia Nisia
EL EL63 Dytiki Ellada
EL EL64 Sterea Ellada
EL EL65 Peloponnisos
ES ES11 Galicia
ES ES12 Principado de Asturias
ES ES13 Cantabria
ES ES21 País Vasco
ES ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra
ES ES23 La Rioja
ES ES24 Aragón
ES ES30 Comunidad de Madrid
ES ES41 Castilla y León
ES ES42 Castilla-La Mancha
ES ES43 Extremadura
ES ES51 Cataluña
ES ES52 Comunidad Valenciana
ES ES53 Illes Balears
ES ES61 Andalucía
ES ES62 Región de Murcia
FI FI19 Länsi-Suomi
FI FI18 Helsinki-Uusimaa+Etelä-Suomi
FI FI1D Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi






Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Region Label
FR FR26 Bourgogne













FR FR82 Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur
FR FR83 Corse
HR HR03 Jadranska Hrvatska








IE IE01 Border, Midland and Western
IE IE02 Southern and Eastern
IT ITC1 Piemonte
IT ITC2 Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste
Continued on next page
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IT ITH1 Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen
IT ITH2 Provincia Autonoma di Trento
IT ITH3 Veneto
















Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Region Label
NL NL41 Noord-Brabant


























RO RO31 Sud - Muntenia
RO RO32 Bucureşti - Ilfov
Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Region Label
RO RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia
RO RO42 Vest
SE SE11 Stockholm
SE SE12 Östra Mellansverige
SE SE21 Småland med öarna
SE SE22 Sydsverige
SE SE23 Västsverige
SE SE31 Norra Mellansverige
SE SE32 Mellersta Norrland
SE SE33 Övre Norrland
SI SI03 Vzhodna Slovenija
SI SI04 Zahodna Slovenija
SK SK01 Bratislavský kraj
SK SK02 Západné Slovensko
SK SK03 Stredné Slovensko
SK SK04 Východné Slovensko
UK UKC1 Tees Valley and Durham
UK UKC2 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear
UK UKD1 Cumbria




UK UKE1 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire
UK UKE2 North Yorkshire
UK UKE3 South Yorkshire
UK UKE4 West Yorkshire
UK UKF1 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire
UK UKF2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire
Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Region Label
UK UKF3 Lincolnshire
UK UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire
UK UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire
UK UKG3 West Midlands
UK UKH1 East Anglia
UK UKH2 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire
UK UKH3 Essex
UK UKI1 Inner London
UK UKI2 Outer London
UK UKJ1 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire
UK UKJ2 Surrey, East and West Sussex
UK UKJ3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight
UK UKJ4 Kent
UK UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area
UK UKK2 Dorset and Somerset
UK UKK3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
UK UKK4 Devon
UK UKL1 West Wales and The Valleys
UK UKL2 East Wales
UK UKM2 Eastern Scotland
UK UKM3 South Western Scotland
UK UKM5 North Eastern Scotland
UK UKM6 Highlands and Islands
UK UKN0 Northern Ireland
CH CH01 Lake Geneva Region
CH CH02 Espace Mittelland
CH CH03 Northwestern Switzerland
CH CH04 Zurich
CH CH05 Eastern Switzerland
Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Region Label
CH CH06 Central Switzerland
CH CH07 Ticino
NO NO01 Oslo og Akershus
NO NO02 Hedmark og Oppland
NO NO03 Sør-Østlandet




Table B.3: Price regressions






Industry-Year FE Yes Yes
Origin Variables Yes Yes
Destination Variables Yes Yes
Obs. 48995 48995
R-squared 0.525 0.539
Notes: First column displays the results including only origin and destination level variables.
The second column reports the results when adding the bilateral distance between origin and
destination as a determinant of export prices.
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Table B.4: Average border effect - Complete table
Dep. Var: ln(Sn,m) Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 Block 8 Block 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Border -1.786 -1.721 -1.699 -1.768 -1.686 -1.796 -1.687 -1.754 -1.858
(0.182) (0.178) (0.175) (0.175) (0.238) (0.289) (0.268) (0.290) (0.201)
Distance -0.899 -1.378 -1.643 -0.618 -1.949 -0.532 -1.105 -1.066 -1.118
(0.440) (0.276) (0.377) (0.315) (0.828) (0.696) (0.497) (0.372) (1.873)
Insularity 1.120 -0.861 -0.157 -0.491 -1.777 -0.913 -1.596 -1.554 -1.024
(0.754) (0.376) (0.430) (0.412) (0.534) (0.418) (0.351) (0.319) (0.862)
Mountain Ranges 0.014 -0.137 -0.180 -0.134 -0.322 -0.088 -0.229 -0.257 -0.095
(0.074) (0.071) (0.080) (0.082) (0.175) (0.102) (0.089) (0.097) (0.243)
River Basin 0.220 0.141 0.132 0.477 0.155 0.514 0.413 0.348 0.594
(0.182) (0.123) (0.168) (0.166) (0.203) (0.181) (0.192) (0.174) (0.458)
Remoteness 2.236 3.236 3.339 1.335 3.412 0.803 2.086 2.167 1.356
(0.625) (0.783) (0.595) (0.606) (1.557) (1.219) (0.889) (0.833) (2.833)
Number of Borders 7.058 6.695 7.041 10.779 11.294 11.833 9.234 8.091 0.420
(1.756) (1.970) (2.034) (1.730) (2.064) (2.783) (2.792) (3.063) (2.944)
Constant -52.432 -53.962 -55.214 -70.492 -79.496 -74.367 -63.052 -56.456 -4.131
(11.534) (12.696) (12.979) (10.102) (12.606) (15.500) (15.239) (16.468) (20.347)
N 645 813 1024 1364 968 1267 2011 2948 637
R2 .572 .533 .501 .47 .375 .388 .31 .285 .299
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the (log) normalized market share of n in m. Border is a
dummy for international border. Number of Borders is the average of the share of international borders that are faced by n and m. Distance is (log) bilateral
distance between origin and destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one of the regions is an island. Mountain Ranges is the highest difference in
elevation between two regions in metres (difference between highest point and lowest point, in logs), River Basin takes value 1 if the region pair shares a river
basin and Remoteness is the log of the average remoteness of the origin and the destination regions.
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Table B.5: Average border effect - No number of borders
Dep. Var: ln(Sn,m) Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 Block 8 Block 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Border -1.478 -1.382 -1.336 -1.166 -1.092 -1.162 -1.215 -1.350 -1.841
(0.193) (0.208) (0.174) (0.202) (0.210) (0.216) (0.189) (0.199) (0.209)
Distance -0.807 -1.508 -1.917 -0.660 -2.161 -0.843 -1.289 -1.190 -1.098
(0.458) (0.327) (0.439) (0.349) (0.898) (0.771) (0.523) (0.361) (1.843)
Insularity 1.298 -0.833 -0.259 -0.653 -2.202 -1.419 -1.969 -1.836 -1.020
(0.520) (0.379) (0.380) (0.417) (0.588) (0.490) (0.398) (0.303) (0.853)
Mountain Ranges -0.002 -0.110 -0.137 -0.079 -0.269 -0.079 -0.211 -0.242 -0.090
(0.091) (0.089) (0.091) (0.106) (0.193) (0.106) (0.093) (0.098) (0.232)
River Basin 0.471 0.300 0.212 0.732 0.315 0.635 0.470 0.409 0.606
(0.219) (0.171) (0.212) (0.232) (0.257) (0.210) (0.198) (0.194) (0.431)
Remoteness 2.795 3.886 4.087 2.213 4.674 2.384 3.327 3.228 1.368
(0.735) (1.005) (0.797) (0.776) (1.691) (1.211) (0.913) (0.720) (2.838)
Constant -13.122 -16.590 -15.672 -10.163 -17.628 -10.528 -13.645 -13.189 -1.784
(3.456) (5.477) (3.780) (3.555) (5.732) (3.785) (3.384) (3.466) (8.180)
N 645 813 1024 1364 968 1267 2011 2948 637
R2 .499 .473 .454 .384 .302 .314 .276 .262 .299
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the (log) normalized market share of n in m. Border
is a dummy for international border. Distance is (log) bilateral distance between origin and destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one
of the regions is an island. Mountain Ranges is the highest difference in elevation between two regions in metres (difference between highest point and
lowest point, in logs), River Basin takes value 1 if the region pair shares a river basin and Remoteness is the log of the average remoteness of the origin
and the destination regions.
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Table B.6: Summary statistics of covariates by block: Conditional on Border in 1910=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Distance 271.968 371.468 455.596 535.897 657.689 665.057
97.15 113.65 131.67 170.34 217.44 274.37
Insularity 0.072 0.098 0.086 0.040 0.050 0.056
0.26 0.30 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.23
Mountain Ranges 5.532 5.873 6.114 6.157 6.344 6.552
0.98 0.90 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.80
River Basin 0.203 0.170 0.174 0.229 0.275 0.689
0.40 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.46
Remoteness 1067.843 1028.199 1003.654 992.166 1001.298 1036.640
235.34 206.65 183.78 164.26 142.07 144.14
Estimated propensity score 0.170 0.311 0.439 0.559 0.685 0.814
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
N 775 552 466 375 298 161
Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of each geographical covariate and the propensity score in each block.
Distance is bilateral distance between origin and destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one of the regions is an island.
Mountain Ranges is the highest difference in elevation between two regions in metres (difference between highest point and lowest
point), River Basin takes value 1 if the region pair shares a river basin and Remoteness is the average remoteness of the origin and
the destination regions.
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Table B.7: Balancing test of covariates by block: Conditional on Border in 1910=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance 0.0219 -0.0256 0.0362 -0.0197 -0.0510 -0.141
(0.0388) (0.0339) (0.0321) (0.0382) (0.0513) (0.0779)
Insularity -0.0862 -0.114 0.000715 0.0277 0.211 0.333
(0.0240) (0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0202) (0.0272) (0.0410)
Mountain Ranges -0.353 -0.227 -0.0558 0.162 0.701 0.692
(0.0910) (0.0836) (0.0755) (0.0806) (0.103) (0.160)
River Basin -0.00557 0.0327 -0.0474 0.0168 0.0455 -0.0274
(0.0376) (0.0351) (0.0355) (0.0435) (0.0609) (0.0982)
Remoteness 0.0349 -0.0208 -0.00301 0.00436 0.0235 -0.104
(0.0188) (0.0172) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0170) (0.0252)
N 775 552 466 375 298 161
Notes: This table reports the difference in means between treated and control region pairs for each geographical
covariate by block (defined as control minus treated). Standard errors in parenthesis. Distance is bilateral distance
between origin and destination in kilometers, Insularity takes value 1 if one of the regions is an island. Mountain
Ranges is the highest difference in elevation between two regions in metres (difference between highest point and
lowest point), River Basin takes value 1 if the region pair shares a river basin and Remoteness is the average
remoteness of the origin and the destination regions.
C Construction of European regional trade dataset
in this section we explain the methodology we follow to construct the matrix
of regional trade flows in Europe. First, we explain the data sets used for the
price imputation procedure. Second, we provide additional details about how
we clean and use the European Road Freight dataset (ERFT).
C.1 Regional price data
The subsample of region to country level trade data is collected individually
for our subset of four countries:
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France The French Douane administration provides international trade data
for the different Regions and Departements in France. The data is available
quarterly for the years 2011 and 2014 at the industry level (4 digits of disag-
gregation of CPA4) for the different origin/destination countries. The trade
flows are collected in value and weight, both imports and exports.32 We use a
2 digits industrial disaggregation (22 industries).
Germany The German agency of statistics, Destatis, provides Foreign trade
data for the 16 German states (Bundeslander). The data is available monthly
for the years 2008 to November 2016 at the industry level (1, 2 or 3 digits of
aggregation) for the different origin/destination countries. The trade flows are
collected in value and weight (Tons). For this paper we use annual data for
the years 2011 to 2014, at a 2 digits level of disaggregation (30 industries).33
Spain The Spanish secretary of commerce provides Foreign trade data for
the 17 Spanish regions (Comunidades Autonomas). The data is available
monthly for the years 1995 to 2015 at different industry levels for the dif-
ferent origin/destination countries. The trade flows are collected in value, not
weight. For this paper we use annual data for the years 2011 to 2014, at a 2
digits level of disaggregation (22 industries).34
United Kingdom The UK Customs department provides Foreign trade
data for the 12 regions in the UK. The data is available monthly for the
years 2009 to 2016 at different industry levels (several digits available) for the
different origin/destination countries. The trade flows are collected in value
and weight. For this paper we use annual data for the years 2011 to 2014, at
32The data can be accessed at http://lekiosque.finances.gouv.fr/portail_
default.asp.
33The data can be accessed at https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/
data.
34The data can be accessed at http://datacomex.comercio.es/principal_comex_es.
aspx.
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a 2 digit level of disaggregation.35
Table C.1: Foreign Trade Sample
Country Unit Freq Year Industries Unit
Spain NUTS2 Monthly 2011-2014 22, 99 e, kg
Germany NUTS1 Monthly 2011-2014 30, 211 e, kg
France NUTS3 Trimester 2011-2014 22 ,>200 e, kg
UK NUTS1 Quarterly 2011-2014 67 £, kg
We aggregate each dataset to a 20 industry NST 2007 classification (European
classification system for transport statistics), which is the classification used
in the European Road Freight Transport Survey. This subsample of 58 regions
allows us to observe 2,688 region to country trade flows (region-country pairs)
each year.
C.2 Variables for price imputation and robustness checks
We put together an extensive database of economic and geographic character-
istics at the regional and country to use as determinants of price levels across
regions. Our preferred specification is to pool all time periods and industries
in the following regression:
lnP itnm = ηtnX t−1n + πtmZt−1m + βdnm + φit + eitnm,
where P itnm is the unit price of exports of industry i shipped from origin n
to destination m in year t. The price of exports is calculated as the ratio
between the value of exports and the weight of exports for each industry, origin,
destination and year. Table C.2 reports the complete list of variables that
we include as controls.36 In addition, we also compute the geodesic distance
between the centroid of the origin and the destination region, and we use it as




a proxy for bilateral distance dnm.
Table C.2: Explanatory Variables for Price regressions
Label Included Level Source
log(Pop Dens) or/dest NUTS2, year Eurostat
log(GDP pc) or/dest NUTS2, year Eurostat
log(Life Exp.) or/dest NUTS2, year Eurostat
log(Total Emp.) or/dest NUTS2, year Eurostat
Manuf. Sh. of Emp. or/dest NUTS2, year Eurostat
Low Tech. Sh. of Emp. or/dest NUTS2, year Eurostat
Edu (None) Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Edu (ISEC3) Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Edu (ISEC6) Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Ind Agri. Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Ind Manu. Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Ind. Prof/Science Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Ind. Fin. Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Ind. Pub. Sh or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Birth (Other EU) Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
Birth (Non-EU) Sh. or/dest NUTS2, year 2011 2011 census
log(Heating h) or/dest NUTS2, year Eurostat
log(av sun h) or/dest NUTS2 PVGIS 5 solar irradiation
log(max_sun h) or/dest NUTS2 PVGIS 5 solar irradiation
log(distRiver) or/dest NUTS2 EuroRegional map
log(distCoast) or/dest NUTS2 EuroRegional map
To test the accuracy of our predicted prices, we collect data of coun-
try to country trade flows at the year-industry level from Eurostat dataset
COMEXT. Comext is Eurostat’s reference database for detailed statistics on
international trade in goods. It provides information about the value and
quantity of the trade transaction, allowing us to compute the price per kilo of
exports. We download the data for the years in our sample, 2011-2017, from
the website: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/.
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C.3 European Road Freight Transport survey
The European Road Freight Transport survey microdata is a database col-
lected by Eurostat in order to understand the magnitude of the shipment of
goods across Europe. The ERFT survey covers 27 EU countries (except Malta)
and EFTA countries (except Iceland). Each member state collects statistics
on the carriage of goods by road by means of any road freight vehicle from a
representative sample of road vehicles collected from the national vehicle reg-
istry. In case such a registry is not available, the sample will be selected either
from the registry of licensed road haulage operators or the registry of persons
licensed to operate such vehicles. In particular, Eurostat provides three inter-
linked datasets that contain the micro data at the vehicle, journey and goods
level.
The Vehicle dataset (Dataset A1) records characteristics of each individual
road vehicle and besides identifying each respondent vehicle contains infor-
mation such as the age, axle configuration, unladen weight, total permissible
weight and total kilometers performed during the survey.
The Journey dataset (Dataset A2) contains information about specific jour-
neys performed by a vehicle identified in the A1 dataset. Each journey is as-
signed a journey identifier and can be linked to the corresponding vehicle in
the A1 dataset that performs it. Journey related variables include gross weight
of goods transported, place of loading and unloading (reported at a NUTS 2
level of disaggregation), actual distance travelled, tonne-km effected, degree
of loading in terms of total volume and countries crossed in transit during
each journey. Notably, survey distinguishes different journey types based on
their laden/unladen status and the number of distinct transport operations
involved. As a result four main journey types are identified: Laden-Involving
one single transport operation, laden-Involving multiple transport operations,
laden-collection/distribution and unladen. Journeys that involve 5 or more
distinct locations are considered to be of collection/distribution type.
The goods dataset (Dataset A3) each journey is broken down to repre-
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sent specific shipments of goods between two geographical units. Each goods’
transfer between any two geographical units is identified and linked to the spe-
cific journey it is part of. Journeys that involve either multiple destinations
for loading/unloading and/or different types of goods are further broken down
in the goods dataset (Dataset A3). Each observation in Dataset A3 represents
a flow of one type of good between two specific geographical units.
Region border changes Throughout the paper we use the classification
NUTS2013 for most regions for consistency. In cases for which there was
a change, a region split in more regions, from NUTS2010 to NUTS2013 we
use the aggregated NUTS2010. This is the case for regions FI1B and FI1C
(NUTS2013) in Finland, which we aggregate for all years in our data and
corresponds to FI18 (NUTS2010). For London area regions UKI3, UKI4,
UKI5, UKI6 and UKI7 (NUTS2013) we use the aggregated UKI1 (UKI3 +
UKI4) and UKI2 (UKI5 + UKI6 + UKI7) NUTS2010 regions.
Cleaning data To create our matrix of weights of goods shipped between
each region-pair we merge the good-level dataset (A3) for the years 2011 to
2017. We drop "unladen" journeys. We also drop "distribution" journeys,
since these are journeys that involve five or more stops in distinct locations
considered to be of collection/distribution nature. These are more likely asso-
ciated with distribution or logistics than with trade. We then normalise the
region identifiers to the 2013 NUTS version, since there are some regions that
change name between 2011 and 2017. Finally, we apply the weights provided
by Eurostat to each shipment to account for under-sampling of some journeys.
We then aggregate the value traded across all industries by each region pair
by adding up the value traded in all industries for each region-pair in each year.
Finally, to construct our region-pair level dataset we take the average of the
value traded by each region pair (n,m) across all years 2011-2017.
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D Additional data sources
D.1 Construction of geographical variables
1. Distance: We construct bilateral distance by calculating the length of
the curve linking the central point of the origin region (centroid) and
the central point of the destination region, in kilometers. We use a curve
since we take into account the curvature of earth’s surface. We compute
the centroid as the center point of the polygon of the area of the region,
using the software ArcGIS.
2. Insularity: Dummy variable taking value one if there is the need to cross
a sea to reach from one region to the other, and zero otherwise.
3. Mountain ranges: Largest altitude difference between two regions, com-
puted as the difference between the highest altitude point and the lowest
altitude point along the straight line that joins the centre the origin re-
gion (centroid) and the centre of the destination region. To compute this
maximum difference in altitude we use a topographic layer of Europe.
We compute the straight line segment that links each possible region-pair
(centroid to centroid). We then compute the altitude at different inter-
vals along the line (computed using the cells of the altitude raster) and
keep the highest and the lowest points. Finally, we take the difference
between the highest and the lowest point.
4. River basin. Dummy variable taking value 1 if both regions belong to
the same river basin. We consider the largest rivers in Europe. A map
of the areas covered by each river basin is shown in figure D.1. We
consider the major European rivers: Danube, Douro/Duero, Elbe, Ebro,
Glomma, Garonne, Gota Alv, Loire, Meuse/Maas, Maritsa, Oder, Ouse,
Po, Rhein, Rhone, Seine, Severn, Tejo/Tajo, Thames, Tiber, Trent,
Weser, Vistula.
5. Remoteness. We calculate the remoteness of a region as the sum of the
bilateral distance from that region to every other region in the sample.
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Then, we calculate the remoteness of a pair as the average remoteness
of both regions.
6. Number of borders We sum the number of borders of the origin region
and the number of border of the destination region, and we take the
log of the sum. We compute the number of borders of the origin as the
number of regions in the sample minus one (the border of the origin with
itself) minus the number of regions in the country that the origin region
belongs to (regions with which the origin region does not have a border).
We do the same for the destination.
























Notes: This figure shows the different river basins that we consider, represented by different colors.
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D.2 Collection of historical borders
We thank Matteo Cervellati, Sara Lazzaroni, Giovanni Prarolo and Paolo
Vanin for kindly sharing their digitised data of historical borders in Europe
from their paper Cervellati et al. (2019). We use the shapefile provided by the
authors to identify borders in 1910 between our 269 regions.
89
